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‘Luck is coming to you’ 
Introduction 
In February 2008 I met Elke Jagomast in Berlin at a congress for international 
organisations; she was presenting the organisation she works for as senior 
assistant of personnel. The organisation she works for is the European Molecular 
Biology Laboratory1. EMBL’s mission and structure is described as follows: 
‘The European Molecular Biology Laboratory, one of the world's top 
research institutions, is dedicated to basic research in the molecular life 
sciences. EMBL is funded by public research monies from 20 member 
states - Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom 
and an associate member state, Australia. Research at EMBL is 
conducted by approximately 85 independent groups covering the 
spectrum of molecular biology. The Laboratory has five units: the main 
Laboratory in Heidelberg, and outstations in Hinxton near Cambridge 
(the European Bioinformatics Institute), Grenoble, Hamburg, and 
Monterotondo near Rome. EMBL is international, innovative and 
interdisciplinary. Its 1,400 employees from 60 nations represent 
scientific disciplines including biology, physics, chemistry and computer 
science.The cornerstones of EMBL's mission are: to perform basic 
research in molecular biology, to train scientists, students and visitors 
at all levels, to offer vital services to scientists in the member states, 
and to develop new instruments and methods in the life sciences, and 
technology transfer (EMBL 2010).’ 
On my search for a facility which could provide me with impulses and structures 
for my Master thesis EMBL seemed to be an appropriate place to gain new 
perspectives. After a brief conversation with Elke Jagomast I decided to apply at 
EMBL for the position of a diploma student because I was convinced that as a 
diploma student I could create synergy effects between my theoretical 
background as student of educational science and EMBL’s innovative and 
international culture, which is dedicated to the creation of knowledge and 
learning.  
Several emails and two phone calls later I had an inspiring meeting with Matthias 
Haury the coordinating manager of EICAT2 and the head of personnel Ulla Böhme. 
                                                
1 Further abbreviated as ‘EMBL’ 
2 The EMBL International Centre for Advanced Training 
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As a result of the conversation we decided that my ideas and interest would match 
best with the department of Ulla Böhme.  
Subsequent to our first conversation I had a conversation with Ulla Böhme. The 
dialogue gave me a first impression where the journey could go; how the thesis 
could theoretically and practically cling to the needs of EMBL and match my 
scientific interests. The preparation for the conversation included that I prepared 
some questions. The conversation was supposed to give me a first overview about 
the situation of vocational training at EMBL and the corporative structures it was 
implemented in. Finally I left with a lot of open questions and more impulses than 
I could have hoped for. In the following chapters of this paper the potential reader 
encounters theoretical approaches to this questions as well as impulses for 
practical implementations.  
It begins with a summary of the conversation between me and Ulla Böhme, then 
preliminary considerations about the theoretical framework follow. From here on it 
is tried to approach the term of reflection and depicture scientific educational 
concepts of learning, knowledge and reflective acting, which are needed to show 
further implications for EMBL in the final part. The main focus in the theoretical 
framework is lying on developing an idea of an educational scientific concept of 
reflection and its multilevel associations to the aforementioned concepts of 
learning, knowledge and professional acting. The work lying at hand is the result 
of a dynamic interaction between the questions which were initiated through my 
contact with EMBL and my attempt to answer them out of the perspective of 
educational science, taking into account reflection as vital human source of 
learning and thus the highly transcendent underlined constitution of the human 
existence.  
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‘You have a good intuition for what gets you far’ 
An initial conversation3 
When I first met Ulla Böhme I was especially interested in the development of 
professional skills through courses which mediate theoretical knowledge. Ulla 
Böhme as head of personnel is also in charge for the successful implementation of 
measures of staff development and training.  
Having explained my ideas we were talking about EMBL’s non-scientific training 
program, a two year old program which comprises classical elements of staff 
training and development, namely courses in developing: personal skills, 
communication skills, presentations skills, project management, management and 
supervisory skills, IT courses and language training. This training for EMBL 
employees is disconnected from the ‘scientific’ training whose contents are some 
kind of scientific topics of molecular biology; this training is implemented in 
EICAT4, which is a separate unit of EMBL.  
During the talk with Ulla Böhme in April 2008 it quickly turned out that both of us, 
Ulla Böhme and me, were interested in the knowledge gained in vocational 
training and its effects on the professional practice of the individual participants.  
‘Is the learned content really applied? [B]’ 
‘How is knowledge bound to my personality, what makes it individual? [M]’ 
As an example Ulla Böhme raised the question if participants of interview trainings 
are really more successful in later interviews.  
Talking about the leaders of the seminars it turned out that most of them are 
native English speakers with a scientific background. It was really important to the 
employees that only trainers with scientific backgrounds were employed, when the 
program was first invented. They were afraid people without a scientific 
background could not match there needs. In my personal opinion I assume they 
are afraid that their implicit knowledge would not be respected enough by trainers 
without a horizon familiar to their own. Mrs. Böhme cited voices of employees:  
‘Not that someone is coming and telling us how to lead our laboratory. [B]’ 
                                                
3 This is a short summary of the conversation with Ulla Böhme. The most important topics of the 
dialogue are pointed out. The quotes and questions are marked by [B] for Ulla Böhme and [M] for 
Cristian David Magnus. 
4 EICAT, the EMBL International Centre for Advanced Training, coordinates integrated training 
activities for scientists at different levels. EICAT is the landmark representing one of the 
Laboratory's core missions: the provision of advanced training. 
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Her opinion was: 
 ‘Of course it is different to lead a LIDL5 store or a biological laboratory but certain 
things are similar because people work in laboratories and people work at LIDL 
and I think leading people is what one has to be able to do there .[B]’ 
According to an intern survey the employees of EMBL are mostly informed about 
the non-scientific training and development program by email, also by a catalogue 
and the intern web pages. After applying for a concrete course the employees can 
take part in it. After attending the course they are asked to fill out an evaluation 
form6. The predictive character of the evaluation forms is not researched; can 
knowledge gained in the courses enrich the practice of the learners?  
‘If the expectations [named in the application] are fulfilled, can it be applied what 
was learned? Yes or no, and why? For example: Do people know better what they 
want after taking part in a manage your career course? [B]’ 
The financial administration of the non-scientific training program is integrated 
into the division of personnel. An assessment of needs was conducted among the 
EMBL employees in 2007; the course program of today is the result of these 
former surveys but there are no implications for a renewed demand analysis. The 
implementation of the program into the structure of EMBL seems to be a task 
that, in some areas, still lies ahead. 
‘We do have performance management processes where the superior has a 
conversation with the employee but the non-scientific training program is not 
integrated into this [B]’ 
When it comes to special offers for individuals in leading positions EMBL has a 
two-part program called The Effective Team Leader. Employees which become 
team leaders have to take part in these courses. Ulla Böhme mentioned that she 
was planning an additional course for advanced leadership, which includes 
personal coaching. In connection with the intercultural setting EMBL resides in, it 
seems that cultural differences are less visible in the courses and the staff 
developing program than in the different styles of leadership. Yet there is also an 
own culture that EMBL develops.  
                                                
5 LIDL is a well known German supermarket.  
6 The evaluation form is attached to this paper and is described in the last chapter.  
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‘The culture is very strong here and does what a culture is meant to do, there are 
rules what one is allowed and what not [B]’ 
The original creation of the program was to fulfill the guidelines the states 
participating in EMBL stated. They demanded on the staff’s right to take part in 
staff development and training programs. Ulla Böhme claimed that this is a great 
idea but that: 
‘The program has to be more implemented in EMBL, the people need to identify 
the contents of the courses they take part within their daily practice. [B]’ 
Ulla Böhme suggests to change the program’s name because the term non-
scientific implies that this is something that does not have to be considered being 
serious, especially in a surrounding where the staff comes from a scientific 
background. In the creation of the program people from all EMBL sites 
participated so it could become an EMBL wide program and not something that is 
just required through headquarter.  
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‘A plan you worked on for a long 
 time is gaining shape’ 
Questions and preliminary considerations  
The theoretically oriented part of this work tries to build a basis for answering the 
questions which were raised by the previously mentioned interview and further 
raised questions by contemplation with the topic. The major questions which 
derived were the following: 
What is the key to individual knowledge, why does one person know things 
differently than another one, why do we share meanings but they never fully 
match? For example when we mention the word ‘tree’, anybody sharing to our 
language code knows what is meant, but everybody’s concrete meaning of this 
word is different, the connotations are different and so on. Where is this special 
connection, the rug loom that weaves personality and information together so we 
occur as a new person with every encountering of the world? 
How are knowledge and action emulating? Why can knowledge not simply be 
transferred or copied into someone else’s mind? This leads to a major idea of this 
work: Is reflection a key to this question that discloses a hidden dimension of 
structures of human existence? What is its function and how exactly does 
reflection work, also how can we operationalise a concept of reflection for 
research in the humanities? 
 An additive question is raised by the circumstance that everybody in education 
talks about reflection, yet nobody seems to have a concept or an idea of it. Almost 
every single recent glossary and dictionary of educational science is cloaking itself 
in secrecy when it comes to a definition of reflection. Some faint hints are given 
by dictionaries for practitioners telling one that reflection is something like ‘the 
thinking about an educative situation that lies in the past’.  
Further questions are: Which tools would we need to observe the interaction 
impact of reflection on professional action in a concrete situation? And of course in 
and educational context it must be asked what the results and ideas mean for the 
practice of teaching and learning, hereby for the single educator.  
The structure of the work tries to take the questions above into account, 
meanwhile the focus is always meant to be a specific scientific educational one. 
This is not consistently similar easy for all parts of the work lying on hand because 
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it operated with several variables which are almost unspecified in the framework 
of educational science. 
Firstly a philosophical term of reflection is depicted, showing a historical 
development and a recent, dialectical term of reflection. This philosophical view is 
employed because the German discourses of educational science crucially lack an 
own term of reflection. Subsequently a concept of learning is discussed, taking 
into account the insights gained about reflection; here learning as experience is 
evaluated. The next chapter treats a concept of knowledge as a vital element and 
outcome of the learning process, again the associations with reflection are 
considered and knowledge is understood as bound to the personality, not just as 
stored information one inherits. The following part focuses on the relation of 
knowledge and action, showing a concept that implicates the reflective practitioner 
(as link between them) as acting subject.  
In the last part practical assumptions theoretically based on the preliminary 
theories are made, especially an operationalised model of reflection is depicted 
and the idea of learning leaders is associated with concepts of reflection. The 
conclusions provide further implications for EMBL’s practice, emphasizing the value 
of reflection as crucial element of organisational learning and successful 
professional acting.  
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‘Free choice from a huge offering –  
Be prepared to bend backwards’ 
Reflection from a philosophical perspective 
Here an approach towards the philosophical discourse about reflection is depicted 
because educational science crucially lacks an own (explicated) concept of 
reflection. The concept of reflection which is unfolded here is employed later on to 
examine concepts of reflection inside the framework of educational science.  
Reflection coming from the latin word reflectere is a term which has its origins in 
optics. It means to ‘bend back’. The term already shows its highly speculative 
character by the fact, that it is metaphorically connoted (cf. Zimmer 2003, 6). 
Originally it describes the circumstance that a light beam is thrown back to the 
light source itself by mirroring. If this metaphor is taken seriously, reflection has to 
be seen as a mirroring ratio (cf. Zimmer 2003, 7).  
It is a fundamental term of modern humanities which amongst other implications 
denominates the self-reference of the reasoning. Although the self-reference of 
thinking has already been of importance to the ancient thinkers, neither the 
Platonian interpretation of know yourself neither Aristotle’s idea of the thinking of 
thinking nor neoplatonic thoughts gave reflection a systematic consequence (cf. 
Sandywell 2008, 517). Descarte’s work and his fundamental idea cogito, ergo sum 
provides modern thinking with the starting point to approach reflection in 
association with the idea of the subject. After Locke systematically works with the 
term reflection it is fostered and establishes (cf. ibid. 257).  
In the following paragraphs some aspects of reflection are considered, which are 
crucial for understanding its effects and interrelations inside the framework of 
educational science.  
 
Descartes  
The connection of reflection and the philosophy of consciousness is an outcome of 
modern philosophy. Descartes represents in his thinking the starting point from 
which a transcendental notion of reflection can develop (cf. Zimmer 2003, 8); he 
dares the experiment of the radical doubt and hereby the idea of reflection 
receives methodical character.  The Cartesian radical doubt shows, after all utterly 
traditional certainty has been utterly questioned, all that is left set is the certainty 
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of the doubter. For Descartes this is the point from which a human can gain 
reasonable knowledge about the world (cf. ibid. 9).  
Through this deviation the following thinking of transcendental philosophy is 
massively influenced; before the inner structure of the self-reference of the mind 
in the world is the object of interest. Now the consciousness becomes a correlate, 
namely the fixed centre of the world emerging from the self’s consciousness.  
`Nothing more than a solid and immovable point demanded 
Archimedes, to move the whole world from its place and so I may hope 
for something great if I find only the slightest which is sure and 
immovable (Descartes 1996, p.43).’  
He finds this point in the certainty of the self, this is the doubtless origin of 
philosophy to him. Zimmer claims that this argument is incontrovertible inside the 
thinking of Descartes and contains implications for the further development of a 
transcendental idea of reflection (cf. Zimmer 2003, 9). To gain the idea of a pure 
self-consciousness first the whole relation of the self and the world is destroyed by 
the method of radical doubting – left is the worldless self which depicts the 
diremption of the self and the world. Then the self reconstructs the world and 
hereby the idea of reality is only remaining as something created by the 
consciousness.  
A presumption of the Cartesian reasoning is that the subject is placed in the 
centre of all considerations; because of this later critics reproach Descartes of 
solipsism. Not only the problem of solipsism (that the self is the only existing and 
thinking entity), but also that all the thinking of the self is independent from 
effects and influences of the world is a virulent problem in Descartes theory. 
Descartes clearly overemphasises the pure thinking ‘here it is lying within: 
Thinking alone is it, it alone can not be separated from me. I am, I exist that’s for 
sure, but for how long? Well, only as long as I am thinking [tbta]7 (Descartes 
1996, p.47).’ The distance between mind and world, between the self and the 
other can not be dissolved by pure thinking and reasoning, but this seems to be 
the conclusion of Descartes argumentation. The human reflexivity is firstly 
grounded in a physical existence; this establishes a major problem because human 
                                                
7 For a better understanding the German original cites are translated into English, from here on the 
translated cites are marked by [tbta] (translated by the author).  
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reflexivity itself creates a distance in the relation between the human to itself and 
it separates the world and the self. This gap can be bridged by thinking, but not 
filled up.8 The classical German philosophy until Husserl tries to keep the validity 
of the Cartesian fundamental idea of the self consciousness; meanwhile it tries to 
separate the consequences inherent in Descartes system by avoiding the problems 
with other philosophical models. 
 
‘You are dreaming about seeing the world’ 
Kleist 
In 1810 Heinrich von Kleist releases a text whose name is On the Marionette 
Theatre (Kleist und Scholz 2008). In this essay Kleist shows that reflection and 
self-consciousness are not simply speculative concepts which help philosophy 
gaining insights on unanswered questions, but radical principles of human 
existence. 
Self-consciousness creates a crack in our nature; we are left behind with doubts, 
no longer capable of acting like animals or puppets, always bound to the demand 
of being aware of ourselves but never fully sure of the significance these 
awareness has.  
After stating this, the following question for Kleist is whether or not this crack in 
our nature - this being torn out of a natural implementation of life, can be healed9. 
Zimmer sees two possibilities shown by Kleist to encounter this humanly disunity: 
Firstly to be a marionette (analogous to an animal) and to have no consciousness 
at all and secondly having an overall and unending consciousness as a godlike 
being has. While it is not possible for humans not to have a consciousness, -and 
hereby not possible to be marionettes- a godlike overall aware consciousness is 
                                                
8 Zimmer claims that ‘Humans pay for naturalness and certainty always the price to exclude the 
actual infinity of the reflected being in the world, from of the horizon of life execution and stop 
questioning essential limitations in a transcendent way [tbta] (Zimmer 2003, 11).’ To him 
reflexivity is problem and solution in one, it causes problems and helps solving them, and thus he 
comes to the conclusion that reflexivity is circular. ‘If one does not seek for human transcendence 
as a theological or existentialistic one then it lies within the necessity of the human to transgress 
themselves [tbta] (ibid. Zimmer 2003).’ 
9 We leave the questions open what Kleist means by healing and why this circumstance has to be 
healed in his idea.  
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obviously also out of question for us10. ‘Kleist not only distances himself against a 
philosophy of absolute consciousness, but also through the allegory of the 
mechanical puppet against the romantic cult of a return to nature [tbta] (Zimmer 
2003, 12).’ A central point in Kleist’s essay is where the puppeteer explains to the 
narrator: 
 ‘Paradise is locked and bolted, and the cherub stands behind us. We 
have to go on and make the journey round the world to see if it is open 
somewhere at the back. (Kleist and Scholz 2008, 14).’ 
This passage tells us, that for Kleist`s figure there is no returning to an 
unconscious (allegedly natural) state and furthermore it brings up reflection as 
crucial fact of human existence, although it can never ultimately heal the crack in 
human nature11, it is an extensive structure in association with human self-
consciousness, it is a journey through the world back to immediacy.  
 
Kant 
Kant develops the classical transcendental term of reflection. He declares human 
self-consciousness is a transcendental one. Everything the subject experiences has 
a relation to it, namely to its transcendental unity. This native apperception is not 
consciously initialized, but immanent to the consciousness. This aspect of Kant’s 
thinking about reflexivity clearly follows the `Cartesian line’ (Zimmer 2003, 13). 
The thinking about the relations of the empirical world’s objects and how they 
come to exist by apperception is not constantly thought about by the subject; but 
it can draw on this thinking of thinking every time and bend back to re-actualize 
its knowledge about its source of notions. 
 ‘This formal identity as basis of all notions herby becomes the 
methodical basis of all knowledge (ibid., 13).’ 
                                                
10 The second argument of Zimmer is not as convincing as the first one where he claims there is no 
human without self-consciousness because even though we are not capable of freely steering our 
consciousness we can use it intentionally if we want to.  
11 If reflexivity could heal this crack then we could not think of the human as a human anymore, 
but as a godlike being. It is an interesting fact that for Kleist there only seems this possibility of 
entering Paradise form ‘the back’ and become a godlike being. In the explanation of the puppeteer 
the way to do so is to eat again from the tree of knowledge; but Kleist could have also bestired the 
metaphor that humanity has to disgorge (or digest) the fruit of knowledge that it has eaten before 
and by that falls back into a animalistic existence. 
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That means the subject does not simply recognize objects, but the objects have to 
become objects to the subject by entering the unity of human consciousness. 
Transcendental reflexivity, until here only implicit in the transcendental 
apperception, means an abstraction of all content (cf. ibid. 14). This abstraction 
differs from Descarte’s universal doubt, it is not doubt but an evacuation of the 
consciousness until a final content which can not be abstracted any further (cf. 
ibid. 14). The transcendental reflection gets divided from common thinking. The 
subject can draw on the thinking of thinking, but does not do this initially rather 
than intentionally. This separates reflexivity and practical knowledge; item of 
reflection is the pure unity of the self.  
The transcendental reflection according to Kant is capable of finding the subjective 
conditions by which we come to terms12. Further, he distinguishes between wrong 
and right terms of reflection. To him knowledge is the relation of terms which 
constitute experience to intuition13. Reflection is not reflecting upon items of 
experience, but onto pure intellectual activity; the outcomes of this activity do not 
correspond to experience. A wrong term of reflection comes to exist when items 
of pure intellectual activity are taken for the appearance and the other way 
around. Thereby Kant denies the degree of reality of trans-empiric reflection; the 
only items of reflection left over, that do not occur in experience,  
‘are the >Noumenon<14 and the pure self-consciousness.[…] In such a 
way Kant accomplishes a radical separation of knowledge and 
knowledge about knowledge, experience and methodical reflection on 
the conditions of it […] [tbta] (ibid. 16)’.15 
 
‘You can withstand everything except the temptation’ 
Fichte 
Fichte transgresses Kant’s model of reflection he sets as a basis of knowledge, 
what was not a source of knowledge to Kant. Namely in the pure self-reference of 
                                                
12 Zimmer says about Kant’s transcendental reflection: ‘It is the awareness about the relations of 
given ideas to our different sources of knowledge (Zimmer 2003, 15)’.  
13 This idea of Zimmer can also be found in Meyer-Drawe’s and Polanyi’s thinking which are 
depicted in the upcoming chapters. 
14 This is a non sensual, transcendental item.  
15 In Kants thinking our capability of understanding the world is limited to a certain point, if we 
imagine the world as a wall covered with wallpaper, we are only able to see these and never the 
wall itself.  
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the self the self sets itself founded identity as reality (cf. ibid., 18). Fichte adoptis 
Kant’s idea of a formal unity of the self-consciousness but additionally he claims 
the self to be the origin of philosophy itself, which Kant strictly refused in his 
thinking. In Fichte’s thinking object of reflection is not an abstract formal unity of 
the self but the circumstance of its pure and accessible identity.  
By this small step Fichte blasts the methodical tightness that exists in the modern 
philosophy of consciousness since Descartes; he opens up the  
‘systematic dimension of reflection […] not ontologically unfolded, but 
speculatively opened (ibid. 19).’ 
 Fichte establishes the whole of the experience out of one principle – the absolute 
subject. As a result of this setting the structure of explanation gets circular16 and 
objective self-reflection is the result of a certain case of reflection by the self-
related self. The self comprises the interaction between subject and object and is 
in Fichte’s thinking only to be determined in this way. Reflection is here thought as 
an objective action. The self is nothing more here than into itself returning action; 
the object of reflection is also a reflective event (cf. ibid., 18).  
Fichte arrives at a term of reflection which does not abstract from the world of 
experience but penetrates it totally; all of this reflection’s impacts onto the reality 
also refer back to it. He states that the self has two prime principles ibid. 19): (1) 
The self aspires to occupy infinity and (2) the self carries the demand of reflecting 
itself; both coexist and build a dialectical unity17. Fichte does not reach the level of 
an ontological argumentation because his argumentation resides within the 
spectrum of the ‘pole of the self’; therefore the interaction between self-
consciousness and existence remains only partially analyzed.  
 
‘You will get respect because you can not be impressed’ 
Hegel 
Hegel develops a very complex, dialectical and ontological thinking of reflection. 
The previous thinking about reflection which produces the idea that the human 
                                                
16 Zimmer complements that it gets objective reflexive because of the self-restraining effect of the 
infinite self onto the existence which bends itself back into the self-consciousness as knowledge 
[tbta] (Zimmer 2003, 19).  
17Zimmer summarizes here about the reflective term of Fichte: ‘differently formulated is reflection 
or the mediated self-relation the result of this interaction [between aspiration and reflection as 
demands of the self] whilst the external effect bends back into the self-consciousness [tbta]’. 
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existence is inherently split by the transgressive activity of the mind into itself and 
the other is adopted and emphasized by Hegel. To him the circumstance that we 
are reflected entities also implicates diremption. This diremption is the source of 
the requirements of philosophy, namely to unify what can never be unified in life 
and experience (cf. ibid. 23).  
For Hegel diremption in modern thinking of subjectivity is not understood as a 
problem but it gets systematically determined; this takes place by hypostatizing 
one part of the whole of reflection as allegedly independent from the other one 
(cf. ibid. 23). Hegel criticises here that the modern philosophers keep up a 
separation between the finite consciousness and the absolute. 
He leaves the level of understanding reflection only as realising thinking and 
develops the idea of reflection as rational thinking; hereby reflection gets a 
methodical character. As reasonable thinking it becomes the medium of 
philosophy. ‘[Here] […] the question of Reflection is how the whole of the 
reflective ratio, whose moments are subject and object, can be imagined [tbta] 
(ibid. 23)’; the structure of this reflective ratio is the absolute. This is Hegel’s point 
of view from which he unfolds his critic against Fichte18. From here on Hegel has 
to define the most delicate part of his term of reflection namely the severe 
difficulty of a dialectical term of reflection. Reflection is a structural term of human 
self understanding; thus we are confronted with a term that is not to be 
determined in a transcendental way19 because it concerns the whole of the ‘being-
in-the-world [tbta] (ibid. outside back cover)’. This means the term of reflection 
transgresses the human reality.  
Hegel solves the problem by thinking transcendentalism as the relation of the 
substantial and structural aspect of the transcendent inside the self-
consciousness; he combines the subjective and the substantial parts of it.  After 
he develops this idea that whether a transcendental nor a subject-philosophical 
                                                
18 In his work ‚Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexionphilosophie der Subjectivität in der 
Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen, als Kantische, Jacobinische und Fichtesche Philosophie’ Hegel shows 
that the one sided point of view that Fichte develops is not enough to come to a comprehensive 
term of reflection. In this context he speaks about the footcuffs of Fichte’s (and other’s) specific 
term reflection, which overemphasizes the subjective part and hereby stops being able to get to 
the absolute.  
19 Zimmer claims we deal not in any way with a transcendental explanation of knowledge [tbta] 
(ibid. outside back cover)’.  
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view can claim a rightful approach of the term without falling behind Hegel’s 
thinking20.  
Hegel breaks with the subjective idealism because not the subject is the solitary 
reason of knowledge anymore but its relation (and hereby also the being). The 
self-consciousness bents back to itself because of the structure of reflection; 
meanwhile it is part of being and depends on its real relations to the being itself. 
One part of this relation between the self and the world (the self-consciousness) is 
not only reflecting itself, but transgressively also the whole of this relationship.  
This transgressing access to the substantial relation leads Hegel to the discovery 
that this relation contains a conscious element21 (cf. ibid. 26). The transcendental 
subject is no longer a fixated point; it dissolves into the dynamics of its relation 
(cf. ibid. 26). 
Now, what are the consequences of Hegel’s term of reflection? 
Hegel tells us that he sees the structural transcendence he discovers not as a 
solution for all the problems but it is rather a highly problematic constitution of the 
human existence to him (cf. Hegel 1967, 57). A consequence of this thinking is 
that all knowledge can only come to exist by mediation through the (‘circular, self-
reflecting (Zimmer 2003, 27)’) consciousness. Accordingly a change of knowledge 
about an object is also a change of the object itself because it is only object inside 
the relation of the perceiving consciousness and its real entity.  
Concerning this Zimmer states: Knowledge means that transformation of the other 
into thinking, but also always its transformation inside the thinking (Zimmer 2003, 
27)’. It is important not to forget that this means experience can not be reduced 
to the presence of the being inside the consciousness; what we call experience is 
the outcoming of the consciousness reflecting of I) the being, II) itself and III) its 
position inside the being. Hence it can be concluded that there is no reality for the 
human being which is not reflected reality. Hegel’s theory is capable of showing 
that knowledge is kept up and altered in the self-consciousness, but that it comes 
to exist by a reflective contention with reality.  
 
                                                
20 Zimmer sees this as the immanent problem of dialectical philosophy (cf. Zimmer 2003, 25). 
21 For Zimmer this is the basic position on which Hegel founds his absolute idealism on. Reflection 
is not knowledge through the abstraction of experience, but rather a taking-the-inward-turn of 
experience itself inside the self-consciousness (cf. Zimmer 2003, 25).  
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‘You show your diplomatic abilities’ 
Beyond Hegel 
Inside Hegel’s thinking about reflection the consciousness has an absolute priority. 
Only if it can be shown that the overarching character of the consciousness is 
anon itself depending on an overarching of the being, this priority could be 
overcome.  
‘Such a reasoning would only be possible if consciousness would be 
made perceptible as not being the Archimedian origin and centre, but a 
virtual moment of being […] only by this the philosophy wins back a 
central, although decentralised, a real, although a hovering place in 
being for the human [tbta] (Zimmer 2003, 28).’ 
Inside such thinking a human would be an effected effecter. The wish of Zimmer 
to overcome this perspective of Hegel seems to be founded in the wish for a 
thinking of reflection that comprises the whole of the human existence the self 
and the being without overemphasizing one or the other. 
To win this overarching view of reflection Zimmer adopts a thought of Heidegger 
in the first step; ‘Dasein ist Seiendes, das sich in seinem Sein verstehend zu 
diesem Sein verhält. Damit ist der formale Begriff von Existenz angezeigt 
(Heidegger 1986, 52)’. This means that the entity resides inside the being and the 
being resides inside the entity22. Hereby Heidegger gets to the idea of subjectivity 
as interlocked doubled in-being.  
In a second step Zimmer describes what is important to him about Sartre’s idea of 
reflection, namely that Sartre tries to disprove the priority of the consciousness by 
showing that we ‘claim much more than we know when we say >I< and that this 
>I< is ultimately a transcendent one, which only appears in reflective acts (Sartre 
1997, 39)’23.  
                                                
22 Heidegger wants to show nothing less: only in the ontological term of the transcendental being-
in-the-world is this doubled aspect of the in-being at all, namely that the entity according to its 
modus of being exists in the being, as well as the being as a whole one resides inside the entity 
[tbta] (Zimmer 2003, 34)’. 
23 Sartre (as Heidegger) misses approaching a dialectical term of reflection because he only 
problematises the self-relatedness of the human being and ends up in a decisionistic perspective 
(cf. Zimmer 2003, 35/36).    
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Plessner24 in turn discovered important elements of reflection in his 
anthropological philosophy (Zimmer 2003, 36). He states that through the 
biological equipment of self-consciousness the human is set into a dialectical 
tension throughout his whole life. Plessner divides the reflective ratio from the 
self-consciousness (where it resided in idealistic theorems) and transfers it into a 
ratio of being ‘which is in the world und that does not set the self-consciousness, 
but that relates to it und must relate to it, because the structure of the life form 
demands it (Zimmer 2003, 37)’; this thought leads to the idea that the human is 
confined. Founded and confined by its position inside the being, constantly 
causing and transgressing this confinement. The nature of the self-consciousness 
causes an unbridgeable gap between the human and the world ‘which must be 
mediated [by reflection] in every moment but can never be overcome [tbta] (ibid. 
38)’. Plessner’s thinking of reflection is a dialectical approach because it breaks 
with the priority of the self-consciousness and shows the structure caused by the 
entanglement of the transcendental reality and the self-consciousness. 
To the idealistic age reflection was a fundamental term but to show that reflection 
is still a basic term of philosophy (and the humanities) today it has to be further 
researched now as an ontological actuality (it becomes an object of objective 
transcendentalism) (cf. ibid., 38). A draft on such an approach of the term can be 
found in Holz’s (Holz, 1972) metaphor of the mirror, Holz compares here the 
issues of reflection by reference to the metaphor of the mirror. His analysis of the 
metaphor is crucial for the argumentation that the reflective ratio resides inside 
the being. First there is the mirrored as ontologically prior to the mirror image 
because the mirror is not free in what it mirrors and without a mirrored entity 
there is no mirror image. To Holz the mirror only exists inside the being (world) 
itself and its reflecting depends on the world that surrounds it, the mirror itself is 
deduced being `outside the world, without a counterpart would no mirror be 
possible [tbta] (Holz, 1972 cited by Zimmer 2003, 39)’. Holz concludes the primary 
position of the being in analogy; in the being the self-consciousness resides, this 
produces images of the being and these images are depending on the place from 
where they are reflected. The self-consciousness (thought of as a mirror image) 
                                                
24 We find similar thoughts employed by Pannenberg in his theological concept of human 
reflection.  
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whether purely produces neither simply reproduces something from outside 
(Zimmer 2003, 40); Holz thinks of ‘the self-consciousness thus as a medium which 
is neither purely active, nor a purely passive point of transition […] in which the 
ratio of the being [Seinsverhältnis] shows up as a reciprocal interconnection of its 
parts [tbta] (ibid. 41)’. The self-consciousness now is a primacy but not an 
ontological primary.  
Reflection as a mirror image of the being is not the being itself but a special 
perspective on it, because every mirror image depends on the position of the 
mirror (the mirror image adds something to the mirrored object – beginning with 
the modification by the individual perspective); it can be said that it is a ‘virtual 
and modified [tbta] (ibid. 41)’ iteration of reality. This thinking of reflection 
exceeds the idealistic view; here the being bends back to itself through the 
consciousness and appears reflected. The act of mirroring is a self-interpretation 
of the being (cf. ibid. 41); Holz’s metaphor creates a dialectical term of subjectivity 
– subjectivity is here thought as objective transcendentalism. The mirror image 
works as a reflective self-reference; the being becomes truth as image of itself but 
therefore a receiving being must exist – this receiving being is the self-
consciousness (cf. Holz 1972, 92). Zimmer who is convinced that we need to leave 
the primacy of the consciousness sees Holz’s metaphor as a successful approach, 
he states: ‘The mirror as heuristic metaphor is maybe the only way to expose this 
appearance and meanwhile to constitute the priority of the being and the primacy 
of consciousness by the structure of the mirroring [tbta] (Zimmer 2003, 42)’. Out 
of the ontological distinctiveness of the human conscious-being inside the being 
follows that self-consciousness is bidirectional (1) it is part of material reality and 
overarched by the being, (2) it is the only related entity that is aware of its 
relatedness, thus it transgresses the being by reflection. These thoughts lead back 
(or forward), although in a modified perspective, to Hegel’s understanding of self-
reference in thinking as world-ratio (Weltverhältnis). The consciousness is 
unavoidable for every human individual; reflection opens up the sphere to a 
metaphysical dimension of human existence, which is caused by the human self-
consciousness.  
The afore mentioned priority of the being and the primacy of consciousness are 
implicitly taken into account by Sandywell when he distinguishes between 
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reflexivity and reflection (cf. Sandywell 1996, 125-128). To him reflection is ‘an 
instrument to protect the mind against its own contingency (ibid. 126)’ while 
reflexivity ‘primes the engines of cultural innovation (ibid. 126)’. He claims that 
reflexivity is not simply another level of reflection but a different ‘domain of desire 
antedating the traditional practice of reflection (ibid. 125/126)’. The perceptual 
framework we gain through our lifelong physical and mental development, which 
will play a role later on, is an outcome of reflexivity and firstly enables reflection 
as we label it; our terms of reflection are entangled with the ideas of metaphysical 
principles and (have to) ignore the ambivalent surd of temporal existence. 
Sandywell argues that the classical, philosophical and western term of reflection 
leads to stricture structures (ibid. 126) and skips the fact that all temporal 
existence is already eroticized. In the next chapter Meyer-Drawe, who developed a 
term of learning as experience, also deals with this problem of dialectical thinking, 
which she claims to conceal the true nature of human learning. To Sandywell 
reflection is not as free as reflexivity, it is bound to by rules, while reflexivity, as 
the word already implies, is strictly egocentric and whispers ‘We want to live as we 
want to live (ibid. 126)’. Sandywell as Meyer-Drawe argues more ore less aware of 
it that the dialectical thinking forgets that ‘reflection’s existential source and 
temporal matrix is not something controlled or authorized by reflection.  
‘It is rather the always-already operative world of everyday experience 
and quotidian of comportment toward the being of things, the rich 
chaos of everyday language, the contradictory pulses of lived history 
(ibid. 127).’ 
This reasoning has to be associated with Holz’s idea of the mirror, because it 
enables keeping an eye on the priority of the being, in which the single reflecting 
individual resides in.  Sandywell cites Prufer when he says that self-objectification 
is only possible because of the temporality of reflection and yet adequate self-
objectification is not possible because of it. We find a similar thought employed 
later on when Polanyi’s statement is considered, which comprises that we [will 
always] know more than we can tell. That means our reflective abilities are clearly 
limited to the state that there will always be more pre- and un-reflected mass with 
us than we can reflectively work off. We will see this is what creates a ‘tacit 
dimension’ for Polanyi and an intangible dimension of experience for Meyer-
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Drawe. Albeit the critic of Sandywell and others that the dialectical term of 
reflection might not be appropriate to embrace the whole of the reflective 
dimension of the human life, Sandywell himself gets to a dialectical relation of 
reflection and its domain reflexivity (cf. ibid. 126). He unfolds the dialectical 
tension between them by referring to Dewey, describing that reflexivity and 
reflection are like the relation a map has to the expeditions whose outcome it is. 
The map is a product which is free from its historicity after its production, its use 
is not depending from the fact that one knows how it came to exist. This is what 
creates the highly dialectical tension between reflexivity and reflection according 
to Sandywell it has even the potential to ‘disrupt hierarchies, dissolves binarisms 
[and] subverts carefully drawn limits (ibid. 126)’. 
 
 ‘Good! You have a sympathetic ear for the new’ 
Learning 
In this chapter first a short summary about the recent discussion on learning is 
depicted; in a second step, based on the insights on reflection of chapter one, the 
concept of learning as experience and its dependence on reflectivity is presented.  
 
‘Do not get stressed by others’ 
A recent discussion 
The following thoughts about the concept of learning inside the framework of 
educational science refer among others to an article of G. Strobel-Eisele (Strobel-
Eisele et. al. 2009), who tried to show how the learning term developed in 
pedagogical contexts and what denotes its speciality.  
Today learning is a widespread term, not limited to human learning. Learning as a 
term spreads over several disciplines, ‘at that the reasons for the boom of learning 
lies at hand. The temporal structures accelerated by economical and digital 
changes of modern societies demand from their members among mobility more 
and more learn- and relearn-efforts, to steadily keep up with the challenges […] 
(Sandywell 1996, 125/126)’. There is a lot of research about learning going on and 
a lot of theories were conceptualized until now, not only by the classic subjects 
concerned with learning, namely philosophy, psychology and pedagogic, but also 
by sociology, neuropsychology, neurobiology. The latter motivates the founding of 
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a neuropedagogic which tries to develop a brain-sized concept of pedagogic (cf. 
Strobel-Eisele et. al. 2009, 6)’.  
Different concepts of learning let us explore learners and learning processes 
where educational science would never have dreamt to find them: systems, 
organisations, programs and societies are learning but also car radios, neuronal 
networks, children and brains (cf. Meyer-Drawe 2008); obviously the perspective 
and the discipline make objects to learners – or not. Thought about it this way, 
learning is recently not understood as a generic term of educational science but 
firstly an empirically recognisable25, not necessarily intentional change in 
behaviour or constitution of just any object. Of course this idea also includes 
partially the learning of humans, whereby this concept has already problems when 
it comes down to the visibility (its empiric ascertainability) of human learning 
processes. Consequently this concept does not explain human learning; it just 
gives us the opportunity to speculate that what we see could possibly be learning. 
Obviously this term is not very specific to educational contexts. These 
circumstances show how crucial an original concept of learning is to educational 
science, not trying to explore and not probing this term -from this genuine view- 
would be synonymous with a death sentence for the subject. 
A notable German professor of the Max-Planck-Institute For Human Development, 
in Berlin said recently in an interview about the resumes on learning made by 
recent brain research that the only thing brain research showed us for sure till 
now is that learning takes place in the brain; it has not to be mentioned that her 
statement also means – and that we knew before.  
This statement points into several directions; it shows how polemic the discussion 
about a right and a wrong idea of learning between different disciplines goes on 
sometimes and it raises the question what a genuine idea of an educational term 
of learning is and where it is located between and in interaction with other 
scientific subjects. This is not about a term that can be directly transferred into 
pedagogical concepts or explains special characteristics of learning like: natural, 
mimetic, bodily, explorative, exemplarily, reflexive, informal [or] aesthetic learning 
                                                
25 An example for such recognisable and empirically notable changes could be the variations in 
pictures of neuronal activities made by magnetic resonance tomography, still those changes show 
us just statistic data and variations but not what learning itself is. What the neurobiology can do 
for the improvement of learning in the future is recently not assessable et. al. 2009, 8).  
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(cf. Strobel-Eisele et. al. 2009, 8), but rather about an approach of an educational 
anthropology that clarifies what characterizes the concept of learning inside the 
science of education and where it comes from. Strobel-Eisele shows that 
educational science has to expose itself to the claim that educational science has 
till now no ‘indigenous’ term of learning (cf. Strobel-Eisele et. al 2009, 7); to her 
an educational idea of learning can not be disconnected from the social aspect of 
human learning and this is where the difference between other subjects and 
educational science crystallise the most.  
But what are other specialities of and educational scientific term of learning? 
Educational science takes into account that the single learner possesses self-
referentiality, the skill to reflect consciously and that one always resides in social 
contexts (cf. ibid. 12). Let us have a closer look to this with reference to the 
historical growth and development of the learning term inside pedagogy and 
educational science: 
1. Learning is the reason for education, the fact that the single human is 
capable of learning leads to the fact of education because most of the 
human learning processes do not unfold themselves alone but have to be 
initiated by the social environment. Both terms correlate mutually, learning 
is the basic reason for education and hereby the prior one, but education is 
needed to unfold the learning process. This is a reason why in the historical 
development educational science considers learning from the perspective of 
education and social interaction. Learning in this context is the main topic 
of educational science and the educational reality, ‘learning is the main 
concern of education and its institutions (cf. Buck 1967, preface)’.  
2. With reference to Herbart (Herbart, 1955) it can be stated that learning is 
not simply an automatic process, learning is when something of the human 
experience remains with the learner and enables one to draw new 
conclusions.  
3. Learning happens in intentional educational settings and in non specific 
educational situations. These circumstances require a learning term that is 
capable of including multiple variations of learning forms.  It has to deal for 
example with the terms of socialisation and its similarities and differences 
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with learning, this has to be considered and implemented in a concept of 
learning.  
4. The single human is capable of self-learning, but this self-learning is not 
possible without the acquisition of the basic abilities needed for that 
process, this happens in ones social environment. In the enlarging learning 
society the child remains an important subject of educational science but 
new challenges have approached for example in relation with the aging 
population in the western civilisation, a concept of learning has to take this 
into account.  
As science which systematically analyses and supervises learning from an 
educational perspective Strobel-Eisele identifies three coordinates that play a vital 
role in educational learning concepts (cf. Strobel-Eisele et. al. 2009, 13).  
(1) One important point of those concepts are the didactical methods and their 
reflection. Methods of learning, and in relation with education methods of 
teaching,  are as old as pedagogy itself;  
‘the spectrum reaches from the maeutics of Sokrates over the natural 
method, as it is suggested in the Didactica Magna of Comenius to the 
reflection of methods of the philanthropists and finally the progressive 
educationalists (Strobel-Eisele et.al 2009, 13).’26  
(2) A second perspective is the question after the contents of learning. What has 
to be learned, has to be taught, has to be left out? This brings an ethical 
dimension of learning in that can not be left out because ethics are positioned in 
social environments and education is directly connected to these social 
dimensions.  
(3) The third point of view is educational anthropology; it researches the natural, 
mental and not at least the spiritual suppositions of humans and sets its resumes 
in relation to the facts of learning and education. 
In the following part it is tried to develop a rough draft of an educational concept 
of learning, which takes particularly the reflective directedness of the human 
existence into account. This approach is made by researching a concept of 
                                                
26 It has to be claimed that every didactical method, every approach to a concept of teaching 
already includes a reflective proximity to an educational term of learning. So we can explore 
different terms of learning in different times by researching the didactical concepts of the period.  
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‘learning as experience’ onto its reflective contents and starts from the perspective 
of educational anthropologist assumptions.  
Educational terms of learning have to deal with transcendence.  
In the course of acquiring this world they exist in humans learn; this learning 
builds up what we will further call knowledge27. The human way to learn is a 
result of their reflective nature that characterises the human existence.  
Learning results from experience, we would not learn without an ongoing 
confrontation with the other; in this dialectical concept experience means that one 
sets oneself into relation with himself or the other. Dialectical because this whole 
process of founding those relationships is driven by our reflective nature which 
bends back to itself and forward to the other, as we have seen in chapter one.  
 
‘You are going to win new friends and keep your old ones’ 
Learning as experience 
Leaning onto a concept of ‘learning as experience’ by Meyer-Drawe (Meyer-Drawe 
2008) and extrapolating its reflective contents, thus an educational concept of 
human learning is shown which implies that: 
a) Learning depends and hereby results from the reflective structure that 
characterises the human being in this world.  
b) The learning process is a conscious experience to the learner.  
c) The outcome of the learning process is knowledge28. 
 
If we think about what was stated above about the priority of the being and the 
primacy of consciousness we have to set this into relation with the priority of 
learning and the primacy of education. Education is the social answer to the fact 
of human learning; which is possible through the self-consciousness and hereby to 
the human being in the world.  
Meyer-Drawe condemns herself decidedly against a theory of learning which 
understands learning only as a measurable accumulating of facts. She tries to 
separate the terms of methods of learning and the original process, which are 
mixed up today she claims. In this context she states that ‘system theory and 
                                                
27 Please note that the term knowledge will be further amplified in the next part, but knowledge is 
here not understood as stored information.  
28 For a definition of ‘knowledge see next chapter’. 
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constructivism provide a sleek vocabulary that learning is nothing more than the 
description of the fact that one can not observe the effects of incorporating 
information, on the operative closed, autopoietic working system [tbta] (ibid. 
188)’. As a result we could no longer distinguish between learning and other forms 
of alteration. Learning as experience though opens up the perspective to 
understand the accumulation of facts as just one part of the whole of learning; but 
what denotes this so called experience29? 
Most theories about learning use a term of experience but without reflecting it, 
even modern brain research claims that experience somehow changes the 
‘hardware’ of the human physiology and denotes a performance of the human 
brain (cf. Singer 2003, 97), but this concept does not explain how the human 
brain gets to an interpretation of the world. It misses the point of the original 
humanly and mixes it up with a biological explanation of the world. Experience is a 
special human possibility (not ability) and it is not the same as thinking or even 
perception. It occurs where the astonishing, surprising and unexpected takes 
place (cf. Meyer-Drawe 2008, 188). In our self-consciousness reside expectations 
but we are not aware of them until our perception denies fulfilling than30, then we 
stumble and fall; we become aware of what our expectations were, respectively 
what our self-consciousness (the structures behind it) intended. Thus this denotes 
experience that it causes a ‘crack in our consciousness’ (Teneglyi 2002, 788). The 
human is capable of experiencing something new through one’s perception; this is 
the nature, not to say the texture of perception while it must not be forgotten that 
this perception has its own historicity, the new that it discovers coincides with 
something that is already there. The consciousness can not decide to keep or not 
to keep its experience congruent with its expectations- by experience the world 
can break with those expectations31. ‘Experience means thereby the opening to a 
world which can occasionally obtrude itself and come into the way of functioning 
expectations (Meyer-Drawe 2008, 189)’. Every experience influences the 
expectations behind the consciousness and thereby comes every experience back 
to itself and influences the next experience. The same can be stated for reflection. 
                                                
29 In Hegel’s concept experience is the encountering of the world.  
30 This does not exclude that we can have experiences in thought. 
31 The self as entity of that is existing in the world (being) can also be an item of world that the 
consciousness is confronted with. 
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While the world, the being has to enter our consciousness to come to exist for 
us32, we can not fully control what enters our consciousness and every time 
something new enters our consciousness, something we experience and that 
needs reflectivity to deal with, it alters our consciousness and the structures 
behind it and we can never reflect as we have done before, just as we can never 
experience like we have experienced before. It has to be further questioned what 
distinguishes and connects the terms of experience of Meyer-Drawe and the term 
of reflection; reflective movements feed our consciousness and the structures 
behind it, which are mainly pre-reflective.  
The links between and relations of reflection and experience are obvious, but also 
the problem’s research has to deal with, if we think of pre-reflective structures, 
experiences which we made before we experience and which created the 
structures behind our consciousness, only get visible when ‘we are disturbed not 
to think about [them]’ 33. The conscious usage of our brain is limited, we realize 
that when we hear ourselves saying something different than what we want to 
say, acting differently than we knew we could or being flooded with new and 
uncontrollable thoughts. Meyer-Drawe cites Waldenfels to explain that we come 
across the paradox of creative answers in which we give something that we do not 
have (cf. Meyer-Drawe 2008, 190). She recognizes in this ‘giving of something we 
do not have’ the limitations of our consciousness; from this point of view she 
argues against an idealistic but especially the Hegelian view of experience. Hegel 
claims that to experience the single human has to be aware of his separateness of 
the world (being). Meyer-Drawe argues with the help of Waldenfels that there is 
no such thing as a total awareness of the self, as separated unity from the world, 
and that experience would mean the opposite, namely that it causes cracks in the 
awareness of the self; it means the unfamiliarity of the self with the self. The critic 
against Hegel is surely eligible although Hegel’s thought that experience needs the 
self-consciousness34 is not wrong but clearly limited. Meyer-Drawe and Hegel meet 
in the point that experiences need a consciousness at all, although Meyer-Drawe 
                                                
32 Keeping in mind the priority of the being and the primacy of the consciousness. 
33 To Meyer-Drawe this is the point where natural science can not help researching and measuring, 
but only questioning and understanding of the individual situation.  
34 With the term of the self, of the conscious being the need for a new contention of reflection 
appears.  
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adds that this consciousness is not just crucially needed but also affected by 
experience; it has to constantly assume itself, because it is not always a balanced 
entity and by experience it ‘encounter[s] breaches, cracks and cleaves (ibid. 190)’ 
with itself.  
If we have a look after the development of the term of reflection after Hegel we 
notice his subsequent thinkers had the similar problem, if we take Holz’s metaphor 
of the mirror into account again, we realize that the way things are reflected in 
the mirror depends on the being as well as on the subject; the being overarches 
the whole relation and that mirroring is a self-interpretation of the being but the 
self is part of the being. Consequently reflection is a steady self-interpretation of 
the self inside its existence in the being. Meyer-Drawe recognizes this problem for 
the learning term, if learning as experience is the confrontation with the 
surprisingly new and alters the consciousness and the structures behind it, and 
then learning can not be an accumulation of facts, because it is an alteration of 
the self –consequently the whole identity is affected by learning.  
With a view to brain-research which conceptualizes learning as a neuronal activity 
of the brain, it has to be said that only brain functions can be made visible. The 
problem is that besides the visibility of the functions it explains nothing about the 
experiencing of sensory impressions or the processing and alteration of 
memories35. Learning (mainly its output) is researched under the focus of 
behaviouristic or cognitive models, as behaviour or memories and the process 
itself is left out (cf. ibid. 192).  
Learning is an activity which is recognized when it has already happened. Learning 
is like awakening, every thematisation of the event comes too late, it has already 
happened when we are aware of it (cf. ibid. 193). When one is surprised because 
their recent understanding of the world36 is not sufficient anymore to explain it, 
then a learning process has taken place already – the fact that this subject now 
knows, that its knowledge is not sufficient anymore was caused by the learning 
process already. The realisation of what we do not know already is a crucial part 
of the learning process; this has also consequences for teaching. Learners can 
                                                
35 At least not in a way which explains how this events affects the learner physically and mentally 
as a whole person. 
36 Please note that this includes oneself as part of the world as well. 
 30 
learn from their teachers what they do not know and teachers can learn from the 
learners how they came to know what they know. Because as soon as learning 
takes place we are altered subjects, we can not go behind our learning process 
anymore (at least not without a new one), of course we could intend to explore it 
by conscious reflection but it would still never be the same again. An educational 
term of learning consequently understood as process has clearly a temporal 
dimension. 
The mere storing of more and more information is no learning process; but the 
implementation of knowledge into one’s personality and into a growing 
interpretation and understanding of one’s life-world is. In this context learning is a 
conscious process, since it is an active contention of the individual with itself and 
the world. Even if one can not consciously recognise the initiation of the learning 
process the moment of awareness that something is unknown is crucially 
conscious otherwise it would be no surprise37. The surprising event of lacking 
knowledge, together with the moment of understanding something new (getting 
to new knowledge) and the implementation into one’s pre-reflective structures, as 
well as the possibility of a reflected contention afterwards are all elements of the 
human learning process, as educational science can observe it. Concepts of 
learning and knowledge which do not include those elements are abbreviated. 
When we understand learning as a psychological term, as observable behaviour or 
as a diagrammatic depicture in brain research the differences between learning 
and other terms are concrete because then learning is not touching the whole 
human existence. Being confronted with a term of learning which tries to comprise 
more elements than its obvious outcomes the question appears to us what makes 
the difference between learning and Bildung38 (literacy). Clearly between learning 
                                                
37 It is set that the nature of surprise is certainly conscious, despite the fact that the surprising 
event and the surprise can be temporally dissolved, although the surprising event always takes 
temporally place before the astonishment; otherwise the surprised subject would have to have a 
godlike perspective. 
38 In this context it is crucial to use the German term ‘Bildung’, because it implies a different 
discourse from the English term ‘literacy’ which is not used homogenous in the English-speaking-
world either. The author recommends for a similar understanding the term of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The UNESCO has drafted a definition 
of literacy as the ‘ability to identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute and use 
printed and written materials associated with varying contexts. Literacy involves a continuum of 
learning in enabling individuals to achieve their goals, to develop their knowledge and potential, 
and to fully participate in their community and wider society.’ 
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as experience and Bildung are similarities because learning is here understood as 
a change of personality and hereby of the worldview, also the reflected disclosure 
of contextual implementation into a natural and social environment are clear 
connections to the term of ‘Bildung’ as it is understood in the scientific educational 
discourse. The ratio of learning and Bildung can here not be unfolded, but further 
research is intended. Differences in the terms could be searched especially by 
examine the intentional character of Bildung and Learning and what about the 
social components in both terms? The encountering of religion and transcendence, 
are they tied to the sphere of Bildung? Does Bildung depend on different forms of 
reflection and learning? These could be further questions of interest for research 
which focuses on terms of learning that clearly draw on the term of Bildung. 
Meyer-Drawe claims that modern thinking of subject philosophy overemphasized 
the mind39 and underrated the sensual dimension of human experience. She 
fosters the thought that the world befalls the single subject and is not exclusively 
passive; the subject is not as free as it seems to decide which part of the world it 
takes in, the human is exposed to the world – this means that the single human is 
not exclusively free in learning what one wants to. The learning process as 
reunification after Socrates, as well as restructuring of foreknowledge after 
Aristotle is revoked from the power of the learner; we are biased of the world 
before we talk about it (cf. Meyer-Drawe 2008, 206). Knowing is transformed into 
understanding when we look at our knowledge in a reflective way. One is 
confronted with given limits of understanding through the whole of human life. 
From this perspective learning and reflection can be a crutch to proceed on the 
path of knowledge but they are also limited to the sensual sensations the human 
body is bound to. ‘Empedokles […] explains Pausanias the senses as hands which 
are spread all over the body […] they are unable to grab the whole, even if they 
often mean they do (ibid. 196)’, likewise the reflective image of Bloch only shows 
a small cut-out of the mirrored being. Even if we think of reflective processes as 
events in mind, our mind only functions inside the borders which are determined 
by our corporal experiences, like temporality and space, to name the most vital 
                                                
39 A typical problem of thinking after Kant is characterized by the fact that subsequent thinkers 
almost ever overemphasized the human mind or corporality; they oversaw Kant’s cautious handling 
of the delicate task to measure the human inside a sphere with multiple dimensions, where a tape 
measure is as useful as a fork to eat soup.  
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ones. In this context human recognizing means an entanglement of the world in 
which itself is highly active (cf. ibid. 196)’. In the end Empedocles comes to the 
resume that in the fight of the elements learning strengthens the mind.  Learning 
as it is shown to us here is a vital experience of the human existence. This 
experience comes to our minds linguistically, reflecting on our experiences means 
reflecting on a linguistic base, the pre-linguistic dimensions can only be explored 
implicitly and they are pre-reflective. These pre-reflective dimensions can be the 
rules of society, moral values or customs of perception (cf. ibid. 206). This 
existing, pre-reflective dimension of understanding needs to believe in perception, 
herby we feel the world existing and this opens up the possibility to reflect upon 
it; it is a preliminary condition of reflection.  
Similar to a dialectical approach, learning as experience40 suggests the ambiguity 
of learning, it is a process that always affects understanding and keeps the subject 
doubting of its certain knowledge; this unclear situation keeps the process (the 
search) in motion41.  
 
‘You react severe to unreasonable regulations’ 
Consequences  
Referring to Heydorn (cf. Heydorn 2004, 104) Meyer-Drawe points out the 
existence of a massive amount of things to learn and a term of learning that is 
almost empty. Developed in a more than two thousand year old discourse, 
recently learning contents are seen as fluctuating and unsteady, important is no 
longer what is learned but by which method. Of course in a concept that sees 
learning as an effect on the whole human, nothing that one learns is ever 
irrelevant or just an unsteady content. This relation of content and process is 
historically grown, Meyer-Drawe claims, and it helps to stabilize the differences 
between the social classes. Her explanation is that the different social classes are 
allowed to learn in different ways; some learners are conditioned in a classic way, 
others are allowed to reorganise their learning contents and some are even given 
                                                
40 It is important to repeat Meyer-Drawe’s claim that it is called learning as experience and not 
learning from experience. 
41 This motive of ongoing movement that keeps the human search for insights alive is also a 
theological (and philosophical) figure which we can find from Augustine till recent theological 
anthropological approaches of the human. ‘This divine disturbance is to me the secret of mankind 
[tbta] (Moltmann 2005, 7)’. 
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the privilege of creating a real connection between learning contents and their 
actual life (cf. Meyer-Drawe 2008, 207). With contemplation of modern ‘concepts’ 
of learning like learning as self-regulated or self-organised process 
(selbstreguliertes-, selbstorganisiertes Lernen) it can be said that here ‘also enacts 
a theoretically already determined privileging of such social groups, which are not 
unfamiliar with self-dependence (ibid. 207).’ The emptiness of the learning term 
helps to keep up a high degree of universality and additionally it helps covering 
the societal functions of itself. Consequently this would mean different levels of 
reflection are offered to different social classes42, while the different types of 
secondary schools offer pupils different learning forms. Is the statement behind 
this that the pupils in lower secondary school forms are less capable of learning or 
that they are simply needed to fill up social classes? With a view to the 
development of the growing numbers of participants in higher education since the 
1950s the latter can be assumed to be right.  Hurrelmann show that since the 50s 
the participation in higher education expanded enormously whereas the numbers 
of lower secondary education have shrunk. This is probably not an effect of a 
growing number of better learners43 but simply a reaction to social needs; namely 
the needs of a society which uses more learners of different reflective quality as 
before44. The influences of society onto the subject are disguised and amplified by 
the education system; the picture of the self-referential learner depicts that the 
learners are independent from their environment. They are responsible for their 
success or failure, educators and teachers become coaches and moderators of the 
subjects, by this processes they show the single learner what a flexible and fitted 
personality is capable of. The self management of the life-long-learner gets into 
the centre of attention. Learners think of themselves as clients and providers of 
competitive learning offers on the market45 (cf. Meyer-Drawe 2008, 209). The 
                                                
42 Since learning comes with the capability to reflect it goes even deeper when the learning process 
itself is reflected. This is meant by creating relations between the learning contents and the actual 
life world of the individual subject.  
43 Especially not, since it can be statistically shown, that lower social classes are not as well 
educated as higher ones. 
44 To foster this argument in depth the statistical development described by Hurrelmann is 
recommended. It shows that the chances of children with a low social and economical background 
to participate in higher education has have increased since the 50s in Germany (cf. Hurrelmann 
2006, 221).  
45 For the process of normalization of these self interpretations of learners are not only interests of 
the market responsible, but also theories which make one used to the ideas of cybernetic theories.  
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false46 formalisation of the learning process leads to the misunderstanding that 
every kind of change is claimed to be learning.  
But how can teachers and educators guide, initiate or stop learning processes 
when they do not have an idea of what learning means? The process of learning is 
forgotten as soon as it is initiated but how can teachers teach something that they 
have already forgotten? Meyer-Drawe sees this as one reason why psychological 
(social technological) models of learning are popular; they concentrate on partial 
results of allegedly learning which are measurable. They do not apprehend the 
problematic event of learning as a process but its outcomes and the variables 
improving the outcomes. Against an exclusive view of neurobiology and brain-
research it is stated again that ‘I do not experience the physical and chemical 
reactions of my brain. My brain is unfamiliar to me; my pleasure and my agony 
are not. If this difference is not noted one gets into a neuro-phenomenological 
gibberish, which is widespread today. Cerebral agents like the deciding, choosing, 
communicating and feeling brain step onto the place of the modern subject [tbta] 
(Meyer-Drawe 2008, 209/210).’ But this does not get near to the position of a 
pedagogical and scientific educational term of learning as experience, which 
crucially needs and provides reflection, as it is stated above. Learning is not 
dissolving in its neurological structures; it disembogues in a way of disclosing the 
life-world of the learning subject. Modern subject philosophy and learning as 
experience can provide us with a sharpened view on learning as a scientific 
educational term, without loosing pace with other modern ideas of learning. Still 
an approach of pedagogical anthropology has to deal with the problematic of the 
subject and the being. The phenomenological approach is not capable of getting 
to a (formal scientific) transcendence because the reflective movement never 
returns to the original point it has started from; it always bends back to the 
subject47. The world as it is lies as experience at hand, but not as abstract theory 
before our eyes (cf. ibid. 211).   
Maurice Merleau-Ponty tries to pay attention to the signatures of life, which means 
he admits that experience will never lie clearly at hand to us. Human life and 
                                                
46 It is false for an educational scientific or a pedagogic view on learning.  
47  This is the point where Sartre (see chapter p. 19f) fails including the priority of the 
being and falls back to a priority of the subject. 
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learning is always confronted with different offers of what is reasonable. Human 
life is ambiguous because our experiences are. Merleau-Ponty fosters the thought 
that a reflective human self-reference is connected to the fact of corporality of the 
human life. He sees a strange abstraction in the dualism between mind and body 
and claims that both only exist together, still his argumentation is not capable of 
disproving the dualistic argumentation (cf. ibid. 212)48. Some of his conclusions for 
learning as experience have to be rejected; especially that he states the gaining of 
experience has generally no place in a dualistic thinking of body and mind. This is 
only the case when the material aspect – clearer the corporal aspect of human 
life, is left out in a concept of learning, which always includes as we have seen a 
concept of reflection49. Another finding of Merleau-Ponty is that learning is the 
opening of new horizons. We already have experiences when we gain new ones 
and so learning leaves an index of former knowledge and opens new perspectives 
on experience we already have. Training and exercising as acts also contain those 
elements of learning; they are modifications of the experience we have gained (cf. 
ibid. 212/213). The transition, from not being able to rely on a given fact to a new 
one, which alters one forever, is the place where learning begins. The place of 
transition can not be determined and this is a possible reason why learning is 
often understood as its own outcome, the learning result. If we reduce learning to 
an observable behaviour we lose the sight of the reasons of learning not of the 
                                                
48 This thinking could lead into different directions of thinking, two of them are: 
1. Mind and body are not separated at all and exist only together; this would also imply 
ethnic consequences which can not be discussed inside the frame of this paper and which 
would make this stance more a Weltanschauung (philosophy of life or ideology) or religion 
than a scientific approach. 
2. Mind and body have to be seen as two different abstracts of human affiliations, which 
have to be thought together to think about the processes of learning and experience but 
do not simply dissolve in a body-mind entity. Since it does not lie inside the human 
capabilities to reach immediacy and become one with the world, it is obviously not the 
human essence to be a body-mind-entity. Learning as experience seen as a process means 
the consequent thinking of body and mind acting together, being part of each other. Both 
parts exist, sadly with a widespread overemphasizing of the mind-aspect of the human 
existence, although we can only experience it in a corporal way.  Still a dualistic thinking of 
both is possible as long as the thinking of priority and primacy (see chapter one) is kept 
up. In this case the human body would be the prior as part of the world and the individual 
consciousness is the primacy as part of reflection, which enables experience and learning.  
49 If it does not have such an implicit term of reflection, then it is simply no concept of learning as 
a process, but maybe of learning as outcome or something else. This also shows the huge issue of 
learning and reflection. The author claims that an educational scientific concept of the learning 
process has to have a concept of reflection and that concepts of learning can be judged by this 
factor to see if they are scientific educational concepts or not.  
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causes (cf. ibid. 213). The single learners do not simply gain knowledge about the 
learning content but about the world, thus learning is not learning from experience 
but as an experience. ‘Learning means under this aspect no accumulation [for 
example of facts]. It is a tightrope walk between convention and break up [tbta] 
(ibid. 214).’  
How do we get from this term of learning and its associations to reflection to 
knowledge and its associations to reflection without plucking their connection out 
of the air? A hint is given by Buck, who also develops a model of learning of 
experience (cf. Buck 1989). To Buck learning is a mediation through experience 
where prior knowledge meets knowledge. This weaving of an individual human 
‘web of knowledge’ refers to the rug loom mentioned above, which weaves 
personality and information together. Considering the metaphor of the rug loom, 
the author claims that the constant unconscious treading on the foot pedal, as 
well as the conscious use of the hands to guide the knowledge-threads is 
reflection in different states of aggregate.  
In order to get from this metaphor to an educational idea of reflection we proceed 
from learning to a concept of knowledge.  
 
Knowledge 
 
This chapter researches knowledge50 as crucial element and outcome of the 
learning process, which is enabled by reflection.  
Learning as experience is a constant creation and alteration of knowledge. Not 
only the process of learning can not simply be observed, the knowledge we keep 
can not simply be shown explicitly either. We need a term that takes the reflective 
human nature into account, only by this we can hope to understand more about 
learning processes and the creation and alteration of knowledge. These would 
allow us to raise theories of (another) quality51 in educational science. This 
                                                
50 Dörpinghaus and his colleagues claim ‘that the term of knowledge withdraws itself from a 
distinct and unitary definition […] [tbta] (Dörpinghaus, Poenitsch, und Wigger 2008, 147)’. They 
also state that this term is crucial to Bildung (literacy). Further they point out a thought which is 
closer illuminated below, namely that the connection of knowledge and truth (as it is classically 
made in philosophy) leads to an false and unlucky understanding of different forms of knowledge, 
like intuition.  
51 The word quality is here purposely placed ambiguous and may be understood in two ways. 
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theories would not simply (1) provide allegedly scientific recipes how to create, 
most certainly, specific learning outcomes based on data or (2) claim to know 
what good learning and teaching is based on practically successful, but basically 
pre-reflected experiences, which always exist under the demand of a socio-
historical expiration date. In order to gain other insights which we need to raise 
such theories we have to examine recent terms of knowledge, still keeping the 
glasses of reflection on our nose. To do so let us first recall that Socrates chided 
the poets for being unable to give a logos, a rational account, of what their poems 
meant and how they compose them (Allen 2000, 45)’.  Actually the reasons for 
complaints about the poets are two. Firstly because they are not able to show how 
their experiences and hereby their gaining and producing of knowledge about the 
whole being works; they do not reflectively research their sources of knowledge 
and so they cannot explain why their poems mean what they mean. Secondly 
because the poets are not capable of showing how they come to alter their gained 
knowledge in their works by expressing it trough articulation. The critic is caused 
to the problem that the thinker cannot philosophically check on knowledge (like 
knowing how to poetize) if it cannot be fully articulated to probe it. Allen claims 
that the modern period strengthens such a tendency in order to gain cognitive 
purity and security. 
Today modern society requires more learners, which also means it requires more 
and more knowledge, the complexity of this life-world leads to an increasing 
number of professions and professionals enacting inside them. The distinction 
between the ‘expert sheep and the unprofessional […] amateur goats [tbta] (Allen 
2000, 46)’ is made by a body of academic knowledge. Allen argues that today it 
matters to be able to talk about one’s profession and then only in the second step 
it is important to successfully do it (cf. ibid. 46). This argumentation must be 
considered by an educational science which understands itself as critical science 
and not just as a branch of philosophy that has a pedagogical focus. 
To get closer to the idea of knowledge and its educational dimension, in a first 
step we have a closer look on the theory of Gilbert Ryle (1949 Ryle 1984) and 
afterwards is shown how Michael Polanyi's theory of tacit integration (Polanyi 
2009) can extend our understanding of knowledge. 
 38 
 
 
‘You can not stand geeks, but stay calm’ 
Ryle’s knowing how and knowing that  
Ryle tries to develop a term of knowledge which is capable of showing that there 
is something like a clever practical acting which is not a planned strategy, but still 
successful. At the same time he tries to take into account his belief that the 
Cartesian thought of a powerful mind -which lies beyond observable behaviour-, is 
wrong (cf. Allen 2000, 46).  
He develops his term of ‘knowing how’ as observable behaviour, he stresses this 
part of the idea and neglects the ‘knowing that’, which is itself a necessary 
element of ‘knowing how’ ‘and he could not distinguish the elements of 
apprehension, insight and understanding (forms of ‘knowing that’), which 
distinguish action […] from blind and automatic reflexes (ibid. 46).’  
‘Knowing how’ contains two different denominations, the first is ‘knowing how 
something is done’ the second describes the ‘ability to do something’. Both 
denominations can occur separately, Allen uses a crippled man as an example. He 
cannot drive a car anymore but is still able to tell how to drive, he is ‘knowing how 
it has to be done’ while he is not capable of simply ‘doing it’. But what if the 
crippled man has never been able to drive? Someone could know how something 
is done, but has never been able to do it, like we can exactly know how to play a 
ball in sports so it will hit the goal, but our practical execution is not successful at 
all. So this someone would only know about the way to play the ball, this sort of 
knowledge is embodied in manuals and help-lines (cf. ibid. 47). Allen claims that 
‘knowing how something is done’ is already a form of ‘knowing that’. I know that 
the ball has to be played that way to hit the goal. As claimed above a lot of recent 
practices would not exist without an enormous amount of theoretical expertise, 
respectively of a huge amount of ‘knowing that’. Think especially of a doctor, who 
does surgery without explicit theory about the organs; he would risk a successful 
executing of his task. The executer’s ‘knowing how’ crucially involves ‘knowing 
that’ without this it would be impossible. But if both ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing 
that’ are entangled, how can we distinguishing them? Is there even a need to 
separate them? Just because it seems to be easier to distinguish between 
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observable behaviour (knowing how) and between some processes we cannot 
finally determine (knowledge), we should not simply divide them into two to make 
them controllable.  
Thinking about ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ should not forget about the 
radical reflective character of the human existence, every encountering with the 
world is passing our reflective consciousness52, that means every practice, every 
action has a component of ‘knowing that’. There is no enacting of ‘knowing that’ 
into ‘knowing how’ without reflective processes. Ryle’s theory lacks of subtlety but 
shows much unveiled that need to rethink our separation of knowledge and 
abilities.  
 
‘Your ideas are praised’ 
Polanyi’s idea of knowing how and knowing that 
For better understanding Polanyi’s concept is shown in several steps, starting with 
the idea of tacit integration which describes the integration of objects of our 
awareness into wholes within wholes, hereby the former objects of awareness 
become instruments of attending to new focussed objects: 
 
A tacit integration 
Allen claims referring to Brentano and Polanyi that all mental acts are intentional 
respectively directed to any object. But instead of Brentano, who thinks subject A 
attends to object B, Polanyi states that subject A attends to object C from object 
B. Polanyi depicts that our consciousness has a double set of objects ‘the 
subsidiary and the focal, or proximate and distal (ibid. 48)’. Polanyi’s metaphor to 
explain this is to imagine driving in a nail with a hammer. While the focal object is 
the nail one uses the subsidiary object, namely the hammer to drive the nail in. In 
this situation one is not attending to the hammer and its impacts on the palm of 
the hand, but integrating the sensations that the hammer causes into our 
awareness of driving the nail in. The integration of sensations the hammer causes 
guides us in hitting the nail and makes it the instrument of our attention but not 
its focal object (cf. ibid. 48). We have a proximate awareness of the hammer in 
                                                
52 We leave out instinctive reflexes like a quick reaction, which are not going through our 
consciousness.  
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our hand and integrate this into distal awareness of the nail and finally we also 
integrate the events at the distal end, like when the nail is hitting something hard.  
Polanyi dissociates his theory of William James’ pragmatic distinction between the 
focus and margins of perception. Polanyi’s idea is a functional one in which we use 
the ‘subsidiary awareness and its objects in order to attain a focal awareness of 
something else. We do not attend to the former objects themselves but only as 
pointers or clues to the latter (cf. ibid. 49)’. An important step is to recognize that 
nothing is subsidiary or focal itself but we give the things this meaning by 
attending from or to them. After realising that it is thinkable to switch our 
attention and change the view; we can feel the texture of the hammers handle if 
we want to – we can influence our perspective on the world and hereby alter the 
range and kind of experiences we are able to gain. Consequently this also means 
that we can reflectively influence our learning processes. This is where Polanyi 
sees the possibility to acquire skills ‘by switching our attention so that the focal 
becomes the subsidiary pointing itself to a new focal object (ibid. 49)’. As an 
example when we learn to drive a car, we learn to attend to the road and not to 
the pedals and when we play a game we attend to the ball and not to our hands, 
everybody who has ever switched back the focus to the pedals or hands knows 
that this risks the successful use of the own skills. Consequently if we think of 
learning as understanding more and more of the world -by every piece of 
knowledge we collect-, then we have to understand it as constant extension of our 
capabilities to switch our focuses (subsidiary and proximate) into bigger contexts. 
Here knowledge is then a medium and outcome of the learning process and we 
can observe human reflection in different levels of and on this process.  
 
The skilful integration 
The idea of tacit integration of subsidiary objects into focal ones can also be 
applied to less practical and more intellectual skills53, Allen even claims that ‘we 
can safely generalise it to all skills (ibid. 50)’  playing chess or computing 
subroutines, programming a recorder, or writing a text on the computer. We 
attend from the chess pieces to our opponent’s tactics; we attend from the tasks 
of a computer to the subroutines a program needs; we attend from the remote to 
                                                
53 Note here Allen means skills as ‚knowing how’, as the ability to do something.  
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the recorder, we attend from the letters on the keyboard to the text we want to 
write. Further Allen concludes that a correct exercise of skills, of ‘knowing how’ 
meant as ability to do something, is always an integration of subsidiary objects 
into focal ones. Now Allen tries to show us that Polanyi’s idea of knowing how, as 
skilful integration, is not only valid for forms of ‘knowing how’, but also that 
‘knowing that’ is always a tacit integration of subsidiaries into a focal complexity 
(ibid. 50).  
Allen claims with Polanyi that our perception is not structured as the empiricists 
suggest, namely a mere impact of stimuli on our sense organs, but something we 
do. We lay focuses on the world and create views and perspectives on everything. 
This can be proofed when we look at trick-pictures in which we can switch the 
focus from one thing that can be seen in the picture to another one which can be 
discovered (like the widespread picture of a young lady which can also be seen as 
an old hag, or a vase which can also be two faces in profile). This idea gets 
fostered when we turn again to Holz’s idea of the primacy of the consciousness. 
Thought in Polanyi’s terms we are residing in the world and our perception is first 
a focal object upon a field, by focusing and integrating subsidiary objects we move 
forward in collecting experiences but the former focal objects and the experiences 
with them do not simply become subsidiary objects and are forgotten. Bringing 
the idea of learning as experience in again, our former focal objects and 
experiences with them leave something with and to us; they alter the whole 
human personality and influence hereby the new focuses. All of the 
aforementioned leads to this point where reflection is a generic human capability 
which can be seen as steadily altering and altered54. Again we see that the single 
human is restricted by the priority of the being. Even if one collects more and 
more knowledge about the world surrounding themselves, the realty created by 
the meeting of our consciousness and the world is full of obstacles; what is clear 
and reliable information in our thoughts can be an unsolvable paradox when the 
world claims its right on the human. At this stage we remember the theory of 
learning as experience, because if the world (the being) would not have the 
priority over our consciousness we could not encounter obstacles anymore, as 
                                                
54 Here we are leaving the transcendent idea of reflexivity and take care of what we can cling onto 
without making philosophy or theology out of educational science.  
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they are mentioned above. We could not experience that the computer in front of 
us is not reacting as it should; we could not recognise that we lack information to 
solve a mathematical problem; we would lose the discovery of our own ignorance 
and hereby the chance to learn. Everything would always be as our mind dictates 
it, but have you ever tried to tell your computer it should work properly when it 
did not function as you expected? If you did – did it work? Left over would be a 
human which could change routines of acting, but not one that could learn new 
languages, experience art, write a book or be empathic with other humans. 
Our perception focuses on totalities and we discover meaning on their 
backgrounds which are undifferentiated, they contain almost infinite accessories 
and meaningless fragments. When we learn a new language it takes time from the 
point where all words sound unfamiliar till the point is reached where we are able 
to attend from the words to their meanings by recognizing them in the context of 
a whole sentence and the context the sentence resides in. Like letters or words in 
search puzzles the meaningful messages are hidden55 (cf. ibid. 50). Between the 
poles of the being and the consciousness the meaning of the objects of our 
awareness comes to exist. When we are changing environmental variables like the 
voice or gestures, then we also change the meaning of the words which are said 
and also when the observer changes -when pre-reflective knowledge is altered-, 
because the view on the things changes then. Throughout our life we develop a 
perceptual framework56 of the world which is constantly altered by learning, but 
‘these frameworks we employ in interpreting and coping with the world, even 
                                                
55 The word ‘hidden’ indicates that there could be - or is - a special method or pattern of 
perceiving, which is the right key of disclosing hidden meanings in reality. It has to be stated that 
this is obviously a problem of Allen’s parlance. The meaning is hidden to every human individually, 
because the meaning could not be recognized the same way by others. Yet it has to be mentioned 
that meaning has a social dimension. This discovering of hidden potentials in the being, the way of 
encountering the world is a mixture of individuality and a social dimension. We can simply refer to 
Allen’s own example, the word puzzle, to treat this problem by extending the metaphor. Just like in 
a word puzzle the single human can find words of meaning between all the letters of the puzzle, 
but the question is: Are there right words to find which can be seen by everyone? I claim yes and 
no, because on a social learned pre-reflective basis we all share a certain amount of words but 
every human has an own focus on the word puzzles which allows him to see his special part of it, 
simply the letters are the same, even the language code, but the words we find in our puzzle are 
different in their meaning and we find them at a different time and in a different place. In Polanyi’s 
thinking we can say that the words (the focal) are the same but the meaning of them (the distal) is 
highly different. We can communicate about them, explain them and analyze them scientifically, 
but they will never have the same exact meaning for all and we do not find them in the word 
puzzle with the same presuppositions.  
56 Allen refers to Jean Piaget here. 
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when they result in erroneous or absurd results in abnormal situation (ibid. 52)’. 
Consequently knowing is skilful integration of subsidiary details, namely of the 
object as well as of its context and ourselves, into a focal awareness. We do this 
on a daily basis and therefore all knowing is an exercise of knowing how to know 
in the relevant way. Now do we have to give up the distinction altogether? 
 
Knowing as a tacit integration 
We know the objects we use to attend to other objects primarily tacitly; we know 
them by using them but not by themselves and so we can not easily articulate 
them, respectively make them easily explicit (cf. ibid. 52). Allen suggests the 
reader to write down the exact steps one takes to perform operations with 
computer programs or trying to recognise the photo of a friend’s face when it is 
cut into pieces, to make the reader realise that one cannot always point out 
explicitly things that one tacitly knows. Polanyi himself asked cyclists and the 
manufacturers of bicycles how a human keeps the balance on a bicycle. In the 
end none of them could tell him, although they successfully built and rode 
bicycles, they just knew tacitly and not explicitly that a cyclists steers to the side 
to which one is starting to lean and hereby produces a centrifugal force to counter 
the gravitational centripetal force. Through those facts Polanyi came to his well 
known statement ‘that we know more than we can tell’ (Polanyi 2009, 4). We 
know those things we can not explain, that is because we are attending from 
them and not to them, this leads Allen to Polanyi’s conclusion that ‘all knowledge 
and actions are tacit integration of subsidiary details into focal wholes (Allen 2000, 
53)’. Albeit the explication of tacit knowledge is possible or at least we are able to 
explicate some details ‘we can not specify the ways in which we integrate them. 
[…] and even Kant had to admit that the subsumption of a perception under a 
concept remained an unfathomable mystery (ibid. 54)’. It would be a failure to 
think that the more tacit details we explicate the less tacit knowledge remains. 
Since explicit knowledge always depends on tacit knowledge, one grows with the 
other. Explicit knowledge in a manual is understood tacitly, the words used in it 
are not self-explaining; we have to understand them by using our tacit 
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understanding57. Only tacit understanding of something explicit and articulated 
can decide which of several possible meanings is intended; it is this what makes 
us grinning when viewing Magritte’s painting of a pipe which is subtitled ‘This is 
not a pipe58’.  
To foster this idea of tacit and explicit knowledge Allen refers to two examples of 
Polanyi: 
(1) We often search for a word we want to say but we can not find it, while we 
are searching other words come to mind but we deny to use them because we 
know that they are not the most appropriate ones and that we do know a better 
alternative, which is actually the one word we are searching for. According to this 
we do know that there is a word and that we know it, additionally we do know 
that we do not know the word now. Referring to Polanyi this is only possible 
because we know in two different ways, namely tacitly and explicitly (cf. ibid. 54) 
(picture one).  
Additionally Polanyi brings another language based example in, namely that we 
know about how big our vocabulary in a certain language is, although we cannot 
count the words we know it is big or small and we know if we have a specific 
range of specifically technical words or not.  
(2) The second point is that 
 ‘we can judge the correctness of our use of words, and grope for what 
the French call le mot juste, only because tacitly we know what we 
mean and so can recognize the right word when we have found it (ibid. 
54).’ 
Tacit knowing allows us to compare our explicit statements with the tacit 
meaning; conversely if meaning would not be tacit we could not compare it to our 
utterances.  
 
                                                
57 The opposite idea of this is, as many philosophers argue, that we can articulate all knowledge; 
that we are able to make every bit of it explicit. Then ‘[…] Wittgenstein would have been correct 
when he said […] that language is the limit of one’s world. […] We would be trapped within our 
existing stock of words […]. It would follow that language and knowledge could not grow (Allen 
2000, 54)’.  
 
58 The Treachery of Images, 1928-1929. 
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(Picture one) 
 
Further Polanyi brings another language based example in, namely that we know 
about how big our vocabulary in a certain language is, although we cannot count 
the words we know it is big or small and we know if we have a specific range of 
specific technical words or not.  
Both examples lead to the result that without the tacit dimension knowledge could 
not be extended and hereby human learning could not take place. We could 
especially never express new ideas, for which are no words existing already and if 
we invented one to express ourselves, yet it would mean nothing than strange 
sounds to other people. But inside the framework of educational science we have 
to take account of the radical new and that it steadily comes to exist, fighting with 
the existing, reflexive, reflective and pre-reflective, about the right of disclosing 
our reality. Allen claims that ‘When you have something radically new to say, you 
have to rely on your audience’s tacit powers of apprehension, their ability to 
attend from your words […] to what you are trying to convey (ibid. 55). It is a 
confused concept of language to think that the literal meaning of utterances and 
written language is normal and that metaphoric statements and analogies are 
 46 
outstanding or special cases. The literal meaning of language is empty; it is not 
living language but the corpse of it that remains when you take all other human 
aspects of language away; which is then not capable of expressing the unknown 
and new. Since language is always a reflection of the world, we know that as a 
reflection it depends on the perspective and the nature of the mirror, what mirror 
image is shown. Totally literal language would be a mirror which is not capable of 
reflecting anything; no picture would come to exist, because there would be no 
tension between the pole of the consciousness and the world. We cannot dissolve 
our consciousness from its reflective fixation, we cannot stop experiencing and 
learning, we can simply influence our perception, as it is something that we do. So 
language is also a highly tacitly underlined possibility of human nature, which can 
be the means of rendering knowledge explicit. The tacit controls the explicit – the 
pre-reflective controls the reflective. If we apply this line of thought to scientific 
proofs (humanities and life science), which are linguistic chains of reasoning (and 
hereby a matter of language) one will always end up in an infinite regress, when 
trying to explicate the tacit dimensions underlying the different proofs (cf. Allen 
2000, 55).  
Allen further talks about a tacit ability of recognition of what we cannot specify. A 
detective searching for ‘something suspicious’ in a crime scene, a person 
‘scanning’ through pages of a book of a familiar language, to find some useful 
information on a special topic, the goalkeeper that copes with incoming balls; all 
of them depend on a feature of our knowing – the tacit ability of recognition.  
Knowledge we explicitly acquire has to slip into our consciousness to be of use (cf. 
ibid. 56). Like when we familiarise with a foreign language by explicitly learning 
the rules and words; to the point were one forgets the explicit rules and simply 
remembers them tacitly in a fluent use of the language. ‘All this knowledge, which 
we have acquired and at our command, but of which we are normally not focally 
and explicitly aware, is latent knowledge (ibid. 56)’. We reflectively know that we 
keep this knowledge and have an idea of what it enables us to do, but we cannot 
simply explicate all of it and we highly rely on it. It is like an ‘intellectual […] 
framework’ to us ‘to bear, to recognize, interpret, comprehend and act upon and 
within the world around us (ibid. 56)’.  
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Bravo! You are solving problems in no time’ 
Consequences through tacit integration 
If we perform knowing as tacit integration there is always the chance that 
something goes wrong, we can never get to a logical knowledge. Descartes clear 
and distinct ideas and the sense-data of the empiricists are such examples for 
allegedly logical knowledge to which the single human simply has to receive 
correctly to get to incorrectable insights. Allen argues that even Descarte’s cogito 
sum is possibly wrong and that thinkers mistakenly interpreted it as an inference, 
but it is an existential certainty (cf. Allen 2000, 57). The original of Descartes´ 
cribbed quotation is si fallor sum (though I err, I exist) which was made by St. 
Augustine, it is this quote that seems to take into account human learning as 
experience and knowledge as a personal dimension, therefore it seems to be the 
much better option for an perspective of educational science to refer to this quote. 
Cogito ergo sum seems less like a real certainty or a convincing idea and more like 
the religious hope: May it be this way, let us exist because we think we do. Made 
explicitly it shows human longings for incorrectable knowledge and shows how it 
comes to the claims of science to search for absolute incorrigible knowledge. The 
simple truth that there is no such thing as an always and correct sentence, is 
something we explicitly know but we have to implicitly understand59. As long as a 
theory does not take into account this circumstance, scientists will carry there pre-
reflected believes into their work and albeit this can never be overcome anyways, 
is it doubtful how good a theory really clings to the human life-world which is not 
at least trying to. Reflexively illuminate their basics. The circumstance that 
knowledge is full of pre-reflected or tacit knowledge is also caused to the fact that 
knowledge is always personal; as we have seen above we never share exactly the 
same connotations to words, we never encounter new experiences with the same 
presuppositions. Therefore it has to be stated that knowledge is personal and 
there is no such thing as Popper’s ‘Third World’ of ‘impersonal’ or ‘objective’ 
knowledge, in books and other recordings (cf. ibid. 57); when we encounter such 
documents, we get to them by ourselves, we understand them with our own mind 
– nothing is knowledge until someone knows it. The word someone is the 
                                                
59 This ‘truth’ itself is just another setting because there is a possibility that concrete and 
everlasting sentences exist.  
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important one in the last sentence, a machine does not perceive and interpret; 
nothing is sinking in into its tacit dimension, we have to interpret and understand 
to make knowledge out of data. This has also to do with responsibility for our own 
knowledge, since it is something we do perform, it is something we partially 
produce. We are not capable of fully steering the process but we are capable of 
reflecting about it, making it more explicit. One could argue this would end in a 
never ending circle of self-explication which would make us unable to act and 
decide anymore, although the author doubts this, here we are talking about 
science, whose task is not to perform and act inside its field of observation, but to 
explicate parts of human life, make them explicit so they can be improved.  
The right way of explication is fought about, the different methods of gathering 
knowledge like qualitative ones and quantitative ones argue about there claim on 
the better access to the educational reality. Sadly this discussion ignores that it is 
the art of interpreting gathered data which also counts. The explicit fight goes on 
about the right instruments but tacitly we fight about the way of interpretating. 
There are those kind of interpretative techniques60 which attend from the data of 
their instruments (let us take a questionnaire, for example) intuitively to their 
interpretations- naturally we interpret tacitly as we have seen above- but then 
there is no further step of disclosing this tacit interpretation (a questioning of the 
interpretation itself). This kind of interpretations simply collapse into themselves, 
the best they can get to is depicting the reality of education as they have seen 
and predicted it from the beginning. But what if there are surprising outcomes in 
such a research? Is not this the proof that this procedure is also capable of leading 
to something new, to outcomes which were not predetermined by the setting and 
that the result does not always reside inside its expectations? No, it does not, it 
simply shows that there were tacit contents in the preliminary and pre-reflected 
considerations before the data gathering which were not reflected (explicitly 
known) and now they show themselves explicitly. The key to recognize at least 
the predetermination of outcomes of research is to set the gather data and the 
interpretation into a bigger picture. The only techniques the author is familiar with 
which try to do so are hermeneutical procedures.  
                                                
60 In this case we also have to talk about people and not only techniques, because almost all 
interpretative techniques let the interpreter decide how to interpret the data and in which way. 
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Knowing how and knowing that contain and presuppose each other: ‘knowing that 
always requires tacit skills of knowing how to know that, in the strong sense in 
which ‘knowing how’ means actual ability […] while every exercise of any activity, 
[…], always requires a primarily tacit recognition and comprehension, a knowing 
that, of that with which one is dealing, one’s situation, one’s aim, and how they 
are all changing (Allen 2000, 57/58)’.  
Allen suggests to leave the distinction between knowing how and knowing that 
behind and develops an own model. Allen proposes, depending on the actual 
situational variables, the following replacements for knowing how and knowing 
that (cf. ibid. 58/59): 
 
1. ‘Skills and arts61 in general’ 
Meant are skills and arts which one is able to perform, or once was able to 
perform and which are not forgotten; imagine a crippled man who could drive a 
car before, but now he lost the ability to do so; still he keeps the tacit knowledge 
how to do so. Skills and arts are primarily tacitly known and tacitly executed and 
include all forms of possible human knowledge. 
 
2. ‘Preceptory and motor skills and arts’ 
This includes skills and arts of the whole body or of specific parts of it, like 
dexterity, suppleness of movement and also movements for a successful execution 
of tasks. 
 
3. ‘Skills and arts of a more intellectual or personal nature’  
They do not primarily require a physical ability as an example playing chess or 
cards, reading a book or being empathic with others, but also undertaking 
scholarly or scientific research. 
Allen modifies his own differentiation, when he says that some activities need as 
well (2) as (3) like acting, playing instruments or surgery.  
 
                                                
61 Allen distinguishes: ‚by ‚skills’ I mean realtively specific abilities and by ‚arts’ complexes of skills 
and especially the ability to integrate specific skills into a complex and fluent performance or 
activity (Allen 2000, 58)’.   
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4. ‘Explicit and articulate knowledge about’  
Means explicit knowledge which can be shared with others; when this knowledge 
has skills as object, then it does not need to entail the ability to command these 
skills.  
 
(1), (2) and (3) can be seen as ‘practical knowledge’ while (4) is meant to be 
‘theoretical knowledge’. Allen further claims that ‘it is always practice and practical 
knowledge that are primary and theory and theoretical knowledge secondary 
because: 
a) Theories of performing activities begin with an analysis that is already tacitly 
known by experts. Their successful performing is the starting point of an 
explication of their tacit knowledge into an explicit one. Additionally every new 
practice is partly an outcome of former experiences with the world, of 
encountering reality. We could especially not make up a theory about thinking, if 
we did not perform the activity of thinking beforehand.  
b) Explicit knowledge about a practice will not come with the tacit information how 
to apply this knowledge. Rendering something more explicit can make it even 
more confusing; all implementation is necessarily tacit and comes to exist during 
performance.  
c) The construction of theories has to be seen as a practice itself and so it cannot 
be reduced, as every practice, to a completely explicit level. No methodical 
guideline can tell one how to apply it and also not when to deny it because it is 
losing its adequacy of purpose and does not work inside the given parameters. 
Polanyi claims against Popper’s theory that science is not distinguishable from 
non-science by its use of hypothesis and falsifications, because scientists often 
have to decide by intuition and experience, if a contrary result to their theory is 
simply caused by an experimental anomaly or if it shows that a further 
qualification of their theory is needed. ‘All methodological rules are mere maxims 
carrying tacit and unspecifiable qualifications and exemptions, as in the rest of life 
(Allen 2000, 59)’.  
d) The moment we test a theory resides always in practice, not in theory. The 
search for a rule or pattern starts with examples which raise our interest and then 
in theory methodological rules are made up. But we encounter these rules as rules 
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and not as grown ideas. We do not know the way they have come to exist. Just as 
learning as experience, we forget how it used to be before we have experienced 
and learned something; in this case before we have known something – as a 
result we think of methodical rules as generally correct formulations, but their 
proof always happens in a personal practice which is every time an individual one.  
According to Polanyi we cannot separate intuition from other forms of knowledge 
because the tacit dimension of human knowledge implies that there is always an 
intuitive content in every kind of knowledge. We can never make our knowledge 
fully explicit as we have seen, yet we have reasons, namely subsidiary details 
which we attend from and of which we can make only some explicit. So there is 
an aspect of intuition in every knowing (cf. ibid. 59), but an absolute immediacy of 
intuition is an illusion; we have actually no idea of the tacit integrations which we 
make. Allen states with Polanyi that intuitive powerful persons are capable of 
attending from subsidiary details which are not recognized by others, they 
recognize (focus on) things, that other people oversee like facial expressions, 
tones of the voice and gestures, but it has to be added that all people use this 
kind of subsidiary details; some people simply seem to have a stronger focus on 
them.  
The mixture of tacit and explicit levels, the dynamic integration of wholes within 
wholes and the human handling of this environment by its abilities, is what makes 
discovery and learning possible inside Polanyi’s theoretical framework. We add 
reflective abilities as the humanitie’s capability of coping with the structures of 
their existence and experience as additive in the term of learning, we also include 
discovery as Polanyi mentions it62, take into account a surprising element as 
Meyer-Drawer describes it and end up with the fact of human learning.  
Polanyi reaches Plato’s Meno ‘that either you know what you are looking for and 
so you cannot discover anything new, or you do not know it and therefore could 
not recognize if you met it (ibid. 60)’. Knowledge as tacit integration can show 
why we discover meaning, experience ignorance, learn hereby and still discover 
new aspects and invent the radically new. If our knowledge was be an 
                                                
62 Polanyi’s idea of discovery is mentioned above in the metaphor of the word search puzzle; as 
human beings we recognize individual, sometimes ‚hidden’ meanings and integrate them in wholes. 
From there we attend to other wholes constantly changing our focuses. The moment of discovery 
is the recognition of something hidden beyond the thing we are actually aware of.  
 52 
accumulation of explicit bits of knowledge, stiff and sturdy, we could never get 
guided by our intuition from one aspect to another; the tacit dimension would be 
closed and therefore meaning and the possibility of reflectively disclosing the 
world. The attentive jumps from focal to subsidiary elements would not happen; 
we would not even be capable of learning how to use a hammer to drive a nail in. 
Anticipation of what something unknown is (or could possibly be) would also be 
an unknown phenomenon of our reality. 
 
‘You can convince very impressing’ 
Implications for an (scientific) educational context 
The concept of tacit integration shows how human learning depends on the 
existence of a tacit dimension, enabling the single individual to discover, to 
experience and to learn. Inside this theoretical framework implications for learning 
and teaching obviously have to take into account that we do not have the ability 
to fully explicate our knowledge because how can we learn and teach what cannot 
be articulated? Polanyi uses the example of master and apprentice; the apprentice 
unconsciously embodies the tacit rules of the art and passes them on when 
becoming a master themselves (cf. ibid. 60). These chains of tacit rules can be 
passed on over and over again and we usually call this tradition. By this way tacit 
knowing is transmitted over centuries as long as the tradition is not failing.  
This way of transmitting tacit knowledge is not restricted to the area of practical 
skills and professions. Polanyi talks about ‘connoisseurship’ and means the right 
way to recognise, distinguish and diagnose (cf. ibid. 60). Articulated, explicit 
information cannot replace real individual experiencing of the single learner like 
working with actual cases under real circumstances and eventually the guidance of 
a professional who posses the connoisseurship mentioned above. In this manner 
learners can encounter and experience contents of explicit knowledge in reality, 
recognize them there and develop their professionalism in dealing with the tasks 
ahead. We know from several disciplines that the students have to take part in 
practical courses to acquire the relevant connoisseurship, for example medicine 
students or trainee teachers. The practices and methods of a particular subject are 
arts themselves ‘and therefore cannot be exhaustively specified and taught by 
explicit methods but only through supervised practice (ibid. 61)’. Polanyi argued 
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that this kind of learning is not represented enough at universities all over the 
world. The aforementioned is valid for every scientific subject. It has to be 
mentioned that every one of this subjects has a) a scientific practice and b) a field 
of practical application. Both of them, the scientific practice and the applicative 
field have their own connoisseurship; even though both are entangled they are 
more or less connected, depending on the subject. This seems to be a forgotten 
difference in educational science because it is often claimed that it has an 
exceptional position among the scientific subjects caused by its special relation 
between practice and theory; but this alleged theory-praxis-gap63 is owed to the 
misjudged fact that scientific practice and the practical application have both an 
explicit and tacit amount of knowledge and that the relation between the two 
fields is different – but comparable – to other subjects.   
This misunderstanding is maybe also owed to the fact that the afore mentioned 
practical training does not directly appear to us in the humanities as practical 
training, writing essays, designing questionnaires and considering philosophical 
drafts of the world, discussing with others and getting reinforcement for this work 
is the practical training of an ‘apprentice’ in the humanities. For mastering the 
tasks of the educational-reality one needs to find the explicit knowledge of one’s 
studies inside a real framework of an educational setting, purposely reflection on 
tacit knowledge and implementation of explicit knowledge are the elements 
bridging the two fields, without disowning them of their value and dignity. 
 Other subjects such as medicine, psychology or chemistry are also not producing 
ready professionals either but also learners that have to experience a new field 
after their training, as well as finding explicit knowledge they gained by training in 
reality. The degree of institutionalisation of the particular work field seems to have 
influence on the explicit content of knowledge which has to be gained in the time 
of training, and the practical skills that have to be acquired. Talking about 
educational science it has to be mentioned, that since the determination of the 
concrete work fields for graduates of educational science is not as high as for 
example the ones of medics or teachers. The explicit contents and then practical 
skills which are mediated by the studies are not as determined as the ones of 
                                                
63 In German educational science the term is ‘Theorie-Praxis-Schere’. 
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other subjects; this is possibly a secondary explanation for the myth about the 
exceptional theory-praxis-gap in educational science.  
Every successful acquisition of a tacitly known art needs practice and 
apprenticeship (cf. ibid. 62). Educational systems (and this is equally significant for 
learning in the early childhood and learning of adults) and methods fail if they try 
to pour some recipe of programmed instruction out over the single learner’s head. 
Learning, of practical skills like writing essays as wells as fixing motors and of 
explicit knowledge, just for the next exam, kills the soul of learning. It fails to build 
up tacit knowledge64 and to experience the world and the self new but both 
processes are crucial to the requirements of modern, western societies. The non-
bjective and even less individual tests in the qualification system for example in 
the German school- and university system are just the top of a seemingly huge 
misunderstanding of the character of learning and the needs of democratic 
societies. One could argue that this kind of learning is socially needed, because it 
predicts who will be a good employee, or even more specifically who will be a 
good baker or lawyer; for the field of university it could be mentioned that 
quantitative psychological studies show that the grades of the A–Level correlate 
with the success during the studies and that this is the evidence for the predictive 
powers of the educational system’s rating scale. Not just since Bourdieu we do 
know that our educational systems are highly selective when it comes to social 
classes (especially in Germany), the studies like PISA (Baumert 2001) just renew 
this old explicit knowledge. Still the studies showing the success of students with a 
good high school diploma do not measure what a good medic the desk neighbour 
of this student could have become, since he did not pass the numerus clausus. 
Those studies show in the first place that the tacit knowledge of students is 
important when it comes to societal connoisseurship, as well as the ability to 
quickly learn by rote, this learning by rote gets even more important when 
multiple choice tests in universities start to drown the last creative sparks in a 
learner’s mind. Since learning by rote is no real learning65 but remembering and so 
                                                
64 Also motivation issues have to be considered but the connection of reflective processes and 
motivation surely is an own complex which has to be skipped here.  
65 Rote-learning and drill are surely needed to let the elements of the learning contents lapse into 
the sub-consciousness so we can attend from and not just to them, yet isolated from discovery 
and experience they are not sufficient to be called learning.  
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more a performance of the brain than of the mind; the recent grading system tells 
us nothing about the capability to learn, which an individual inherits; but modern 
society needs learners that create new knowledge because learning is not 
restricted to explicit knowledge it creates personalities which are needed by every 
organisation (institution) that wants to learn and develop.  
 
 
‘A great day! The best for every action!’ 
Action 
 
This chapter examines how practical concerns can brought together with the ideas 
and aspects of reflection as they were depicted until here. At the end of this 
chapter EMBL’s interest will also play a major role.  
 
The reflective practitioner  
On the basis of the aforementioned now we turn to Donald Schön’s idea of the 
reflective practitioner (Schön et. al. 1984) because he shows realms which are 
only faintly illuminated by Polanyi; although Polanyi himself has similar ideas he 
develops other emphases. More than Polanyi Schön is capable of showing us a 
concept of reflection inside a theory of knowledge66 (cf. Neuweg 1999, 356). 
Schön’s thinking approaches the field of knowledge with a particular focus on the 
reflective moments practitioners deal with; according to Polanyi we keep in mind 
that the university professors and other practitioners, which do not seem to be 
practitioners on the first sight, are also practitioners with an own practice. The 
outlines of Schön’s theory getting depicted and the consequences for the field of 
teaching and learning in professional settings are discussed. According to 
Altrichter (cf. Altrichter 2000, 201) Schön’s ideas are almost not received and 
discussed in German discourses, there are even no translations of his major 
works, although they are very widely known in the English-speaking world (cf. 
Neuweg 1999, 356). Here they have especially influenced teacher training and 
action theory of professional expertise.  
 
                                                
66 Schöns theory is basically based on Polanyi’s concept of knowing as tacit and skilful integration. 
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 ‘You have a good hand for practical work’ 
 
Schön’s concept of reflective action 
In the ‘reflective practitioner’ (Schön et. al. 1984) Schön pursues the question how 
professionals can successfully handle complex and changing situations of the 
everyday practice. He researches how knowledge and action are connected and 
which role reflection plays in their relation.  
Schön starts developing his concept of an epistemology of practice by criticising 
the common understanding of the structure of professional practice as technical 
rationality. This understanding implies that problem solving as successful acting in 
practice depends on an intelligent use of theoretical knowledge (cf. Altrichter 
2000, 202). It leads to the idea that there is some kind of standardised body of 
knowledge for every discipline, which can help solving standard problems of the 
particular work field. In this concept deduction and application are the dominant 
words. Here knowledge exists in a caste system, whose highest caste is basic 
scientific knowledge, which is deducted down to a practical application in different 
contexts, right up to the point where only problem solving techniques exist as an 
inventory of the practitioner and his practical acting remain. On the lowest level of 
this understanding is the knowledge contained in the action of practice and of 
course the lower levels depend on the existence of the higher ones (cf. ibid. 202); 
so is applied science depending on basic science and so on. The hierarchy of the 
different forms of knowledge then gets itself applied onto the hierarchy of the 
different work fields, on the top there is the scientist and looks down to the agents 
of practice. The didactic outcome of this theory is among others that students first 
learn some kind of basic knowledge before they are introduced to the practical 
field of their profession in the end of training. Employing Polanyi’s thought again it 
is already clear that this idea is not taking into account the circumstance that 
practical work fields have their own kind of knowledge which cannot be mediated 
by theoretical instruction. This system was criticised owed to the fact that critical 
problems could still not be solved and that new occurring problems among 
differentiated professions occurred which were theoretically unknown. Schön 
claims that these problems result from a completely misunderstood concept of 
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professional life by the idea of technical rationality which worsens as professional 
disciplines get more complex; in clear structured work situations direct appliance 
of explicit knowledge is easier than in complex situations which afford the above 
mentioned connoisseurship. The difficult circumstance of these complex situation 
is that the problem does not lie at hand, it first has to be determined itself in its 
presence, before some technical expertise can be applied to it67. From this point 
Schön searches for realistic description of the complex practical activities the 
single professional performs. 
 ‘Schön accomplishes this task by analyse of some case studies of 
professional activities (for example architectonical and technical design, 
psycho therapeutic conversation […]) and develops finally the following 
picture [TBTA] (ibid. 203)’  
of an epistemology of practice:  
                                                
67 One could ask why here (and in the whole of this work) recent concepts and models of 
competence are left out. This is owed to two major reasons: (1) the ratio of reflection (and the 
approach to a term of reflection inside the framework of educational science) is the core theme of 
the theoretical framework of this paper. To approach reflection as link between knowledge and 
action is owed to the orientation on the needs of a professional practice; and the debate about 
competences is not providing the discourse around reflection with starting points or insights. 
Competences are a theoretical construct which are created by a prior practice that leads to sets of 
variables which are called competencies in the end. It is surely interesting to compare what Polanyi 
calls connoisseurship with common concepts of competence but this is not intended here. In 
contrast Polanyi and Schön approach the term of reflection by implementing it into their theories of 
knowledge and action and conceptualize reflection as practically implemented term, which is 
clinging onto practice. The terms of Polanyi and Schön are partially implemented by German 
authors for example Rauner (cf. Rauner 2002) takes Polanyi’s idea of forms of knowledge into 
account while he explains a model of competence. He also refers to knowledge from experience. 
Still models of competence employ foreign ideas of reflection but don’t provide new ones. (2) The 
term of competence is often reduced to self-organisation and self-responsibility (cf. de Cuvry 2002, 
65 f.) This is not considering professional development as Bildungsprozess (process of literacy). To 
the author the recurrence, at least the conscious contention with this idea is crucial to develop a 
term of competence which does not lack a scientific foundation. Simply the self-referenced acting 
which it is described as goal of competence is not the same. Albeit learning (which are all humans 
imputed of) is always a reflective process already. The argumentations and source of competence 
as reflexive self-organisation would be interesting to compare with other concepts of reflection. 
The measuring of competencies is not measuring the reflective movements of the single individual, 
or structures which help the individual in order to do so, but this is what this work is also 
interested in.  
Succinctly models of competence do not provide this work with major theoretical approaches, 
because they state reflection without explaining it, and the practical measuring of competencies 
has no decisive focus on reflective processes. Finally is the term of competence additionally coined 
by psychological assumptions and by an affiliation to thinking of means and purposes (cf. 
Dörpinghaus, Poenitsch, und Wigger 2008, 144), this functionalisation is out bidden by the idea of 
Bildung (literacy), but this idea is a fundamental element to an educational term of human 
learning. The development of a concept of a scientific educational concept reflection must not 
bypass a thoughtful contention with the fact of learning.  
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(1) Action type one: knowing-in-action 
(2) Action type two: reflection-in-action 
(3) Action type three: reflection-on-action 
 
‘Great how you realize your plans’ 
Type one – knowing-in-action68 
 
This type is the common aggregate state of professional knowledge; the 
knowledge is not articulated. It is tacit knowing-in-action, with Schön:  ‘our 
knowing is ordinarily tacit, implicit in our patterns of action and in our feel for the 
stuff with which we are dealing (Schön et. al. 1984, 49)’.  
Inside this type thinking and acting are not separated, the skilful practice is not 
directly depending on an intellectual action, because of this circumstance the 
actors are mostly not capable of explaining the knowledge needed to perform 
professional action, it is simply expressed in their successful acting. Here we face 
Polanyi’s statement again that we know more than we can say.  
Actions of type one come to exist by socialisation in traditions, they are not just 
situations that are easy to handle but they have become easy through experience 
(cf. Neuweg 1999, 356). This means routines of action that were formerly 
reflected sink, by repeated usage, into the subconscious section. Purposely 
changing these type one routines in organised learning processes would according 
to Altrichter afford either a surrounding which would persistently require a certain 
way of acting, (this would be similar to the behaviouristic idea that a strong 
institution increases the chance of adaptation) or over the way of reflecting-on-
acting. The latter could make the acting routines explicit to the actors and so they 
could reorganise these routines. Altrichter adds that this acquisition of knowing-in-
acting is not constrained to the field of practical activities, universities also 
mediate knowing-in-acting, although it is not researched what role this knowing-
in-acting plays in their curricula (cf. Neuweg 2000, 204).  
                                                
68 ‘What Ryle calls unplanned and yet planned action, Polanyi implicit integration with relatively low 
effort and Dreyfus as intuitive acting, calls Schön knowing-in-action [tbta] (Neuweg 1999, 356)’ 
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‘With your intuition you will master a tricky situation’ 
Type two – reflection-in-action 
 
When it comes to troublesome situations which confront the professional with 
unknown problems the type-one-acting exceeds its operating range, it is no longer 
sufficient as strategy. For Schön reflection-in-action is a central aspect of the art 
how practitioners deal with troublesome (cause unexpected and therefore 
divergent) situations (cf. Schön et. al. 1984, 62). When someone reflects-in-action 
a unique theory gets constructed; a solution is designed for the particular case. 
Techniques and purposes are falling momentarily into one inside a state of 
experimental action. The difference between theory and practice dissolves; the 
range of the idea of technical rationality is overcome because reflection-in-action 
is not depending of the use of action strategies which are bound to knowledge 
that exists isolated from the real situation and gets (more or less successfully) 
deducted and applied when the right circumstances come. This is why reflection-
in-action can deal with unforeseen circumstances. There is no conversion from 
thinking to action, it is an intuitive acting in a concrete situation and that is the 
reason why it can be called experimental action. The techniques developed during 
the reflection-in-action process are directly implemented into the actor’s 
professional inquiry. Schön also calls this (cf. Neuweg 2000, 205) reflective way of 
encountering the life-world ‘reflexive conversation with the situation’ and ‘research 
in the context of practice’.  
Altrichter, according to Schön, differentiates between typical phases of reflection-
in-action (cf. ibid. 205-208). Likewise as in Meyer-Drawe’s idea of learning as 
experience the initial spark of reflection-in-action is that a situation is experienced 
as surprising, unsatisfying or insoluble. This makes it necessary to define the 
situation, Schön calls this defining ‘naming and framing (ibid. 205)’. The actors are 
searching by reference to familiar experiences for an analogy to frame the 
problem; they try to encounter the new situation as if it was a familiar one. By 
doing this they also try to think the consequences through which are implied 
through the framework of the problem. This defining of the problem is not simply 
a subsuming of the new problem under an old routine because ‘the familiar 
situation functions as a precedent or a metaphor […] an example of the unfamiliar 
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one (Schön et. al. 1984, 138)’. The building of analogies has to be understood as 
an approximation to the unique case. Neuweg carves out that the elements of the 
whole problematic situation are measured together but then the reflective 
movement of reflection-in-action focuses on only some of them: ‘so the question 
is what an element sub specie of the other elements, residing in this case, means 
or alternatively which distal whole can be projected onto the case (Neuweg 1999, 
358)’. As examples of common focuses he names (cf. ibid. 358-359): 
-focussing onto single elements of the situation 
-criteria or values that lie under the decisions of the practitioner 
-similar situations which have been experienced before  
-strategies and theories which underlie the practitioner’s behavioural pattern 
-definitions or strategies of problem solving of themselves or others 
It is interesting that those generative metaphors (the analogies) name the solution 
for the defined problems (which are made explicit) within themselves (cf. 
Altrichter 2000, 206).  The hypothetical character of the first drafts of the problem 
definition often gets lost; it is seen as decisive clause then. The concrete situation 
gets wrapped into the hypothetical idea, this causes what Schön calls on-the-spot 
experiment. The actors implement their definition into the situation and have to be 
open for the consequences this causes. In a ‘double vision (cf. ibid. 206)’ the 
actors combine the try of putting their definition onto the situation together with 
the critical observation how the situation reacts to this; the inquirer listens for the 
situations ‘back-talk (Schön et. al. 1984, 164)’. Reflecting practitioners try to 
organise the given problematic situation and hereby concretize the rules of the 
given setting, so they can follow them to solute problems – ‘hereby they do not 
forget that the given order is their own […] [tbta] (Altrichter 2000, 206)’. Altrichter 
claims with Allen that by this kind of occupying the given situation not simply 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy because vocational situations can normally not 
be wholly manipulated (cf. Schön et. al. 1984, 150). The measuring of the 
concrete consequences of the on-the-spot experiments is an integrated view of 
the whole situation, if the expected consequences did not occur through the first 
definition of the situation this does not necessarily mean that the evaluation 
through the actor is negative. The whole set of variables of the situation, before 
and after, are compared and if the outcome is better in a total view than it was in 
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the start, the experiment is a success, even if the outcomes vary from the 
expected ones. Schön calls this the logic of affirmation because when the 
expected results occur but the situation is in total worse than before, then a new 
reflection-on-action starts (cf. Schön et. al. 1984, 141-156). The reason of this 
logic of affirmation lies within the responsibility that the single practitioner carries 
inside his work field. This practical orientation together with the tight and iterative 
connection of action and reflection can be seen as the core of Schön’s idea of 
‘research in practical context [tbta] (Altrichter 2000a, 207)’. Likewise Polanyi’s 
concept of the world as meaningful wholes within wholes Schön’s process ‘spirals 
through stages of appreciation and reappreciation (ibid. 1984, 132)’.  
Let us have a look at the research of Dörner (cf. Altrichter 2000, 207/208), who 
observes successful and not successful problem solving in complex situations. In 
this experiment successful and less successful problem solvers are not differing in 
their strategies of processing information but in the complexity of their analysis. 
This complexity is denoted by a more seldom returning to themes which have 
already been thematized, less frequent problem definitions and searches for 
information and a more rare transfer of explicit experiences onto the unique 
problem. This leads to less feelings of stress, loss of motivation and recurrence in 
irrelevant domains. The capability of complex analysing occurred independent 
from the factors IQ and motivation as well as from the previous experiences the 
subject has gained before; but this capability was enabled through a more intense 
creation of analogies and thus a generalizing of hypothesises to connect variables 
of the given problems. The successful problem solvers also had a bigger inventory 
of abstract schemes for all domains. This inventory does not come to exist by 
learning by rote these schemes, which only leads to a better capability of labelling. 
The successful ones in the experiment steadily transformed their concrete 
experiences into abstract schemes. As an outcome of the experiment Dörner 
states that two abilities are dominant for an autonomous acting in a particular 
sphere of life. The first one is (1) being able to transform the own thoughts by 
self-reflection, in doing so the subject compares different ways of the own process 
of problem solving, thus the person gets rid of misdirecting structures. The second 
ability Dörner names is (2) to import knowledge of an area into a new one 
through the creation of analogies (to get to hypothesises), their subsequent 
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testing and if needed their alteration. Dörner claims that this ability is more 
difficult to learn than the first one; in any case a diverse learning environment and 
high self-confidence are beneficial in doing so. This second ability is similar to 
Schön’s idea of the ‘reflective conversation with the situation’, the first one, which 
is reflectively deals with the own action, is arranged in Schön’s previously 
mentioned term ‘double vision’. For Altrichter this self-reflection is steadily 
occurring in actions of type two but when the self-reflection step back from the 
actual acting and reflects the primary act itself then we are confronted with type 
three ‘reflection-on-action’ (cf. ibid. 2000, 208).  
 
‘Without hesitations you are solving  
even the most difficult problems’ 
Type three – reflection-on-action 
 
Knowing-in-action is according to Schön’s concept the normal state of knowledge. 
Reflection-in-action is not an ordinary but regular process (cf. Schön et. al. 1984, 
69), this reflection takes place in the actual acting and has not be verbalized. Now 
as we come to reflection-on-action the last circumstance changes, reflection-on-
action is a purposely distancing and analyzing of the whole situation. It is needed 
when it comes to massive problems with an action, when there is no way forward. 
Besides the solution of problems of acting is reflection-on-action a crucial feature 
of professionalism (cf. Altrichter 2000, 208/209).  
(1) It is capable of providing the individual with knowledge that helps analysing 
and reorganising the own knowledge. Problems of acting can be made explicit and 
an alteration of the own acting can be initiated, especially when reflection-in-
action is placed in jeopardy by degenerating to an unending trial and error 
process.  
(2) It is capable of providing more than one individual with knowledge that helps 
analysing and reorganising knowledge in general because it gets articulated and 
thus it can be verbalized and shared. Other learners and professionals can 
communicate about the knowledge. This is the precondition for developing and 
further developing of a common knowledge inside a professional field and 
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therefore for the knowledge passed to the next generation of professionals (cf. 
Schön et. al. 1984, 104).  
Reflection-on-action is characterised (cf. Altrichter 2000, 209/210) by its distance 
to the actual situation of acting, because above the primary act is a secondary act 
invented in which the primary one is reflected. This procedure includes that the 
actual situation is left and the sequence of acting is interrupted; now the overlying 
act of reflection can be executed. Meanwhile the primary situation is kept 
statically. This is accompanied by an objectification of the primary act so it 
becomes an object of reflection. The objectification can cognitively take place by 
an articulation or a pictorial storage of the situation, likewise this operation has to 
be executed in reflection-in-action and there it is called naming and framing. More 
than just naming and framing of action type two, the action type three 
objectification can also produce real objectifications, like storable data that 
represent the situation. The cognitive components of the acting can herby be 
coded and saved, this opens the possibility to analyse, reorganise and optimise 
the action. The limit of reflection-on-action as Schön conceptualizes it is the 
problem of time and the problem of transformation. The time factor includes that 
there are situations in which reflection-on-action can not interrupt the actual 
process and turn to a reflective mode. A further problem is the implementation of 
the results of the reflection, as claimed above it is not possible to technically 
implement the gained knowledge into a new situation, even the planning of a 
setting is depending on the existence of knowing-in-action. The knowledge has to 
slip into the sub consciousness as Polanyi suggested it and re-emerge as (implicit) 
part of an analogy, respectively of a hypothesis in the naming and framing 
process.  
Altrichter states that reflection-on-action is usually considered being what the 
common discourse means by the term reflection. In his opinion this leads to the 
problem that other types of reflection, as the interactive reflection of action type 
two reflection-in-action, are neglected. In course of the aforementioned it should 
be self explaining that reflection-on-action is no special scientific type of action 
which is needed for research. The researcher as a practitioner, as well as the 
practitioner as researcher needs all three types of actions to professionally 
approach the tasks ahead. In the centre of this professionalism is here the 
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competence to reflect inside the acting, which has to be supplemented by 
reflection-on-action.  
 
Implications of Schön’s concept  
Again we have to look at the implications for learning and teaching, as well as the 
character of reflection, which the theory indicates. In this case the main question 
is  
‘how can humans learn the handling of complexity, the abilities which 
are required for professional acting, under the circumstances of 
institutionalised learning processes? [tbta] (Altrichter 2000, 210)’.  
Altrichter refers to Schön’s book ‘educating the reflective practitioner’ to outline 
what Schön suggests (cf. ibid. 210-214) by the idea of reflecting teaching and its 
coaching: 
For Schön the centre of a professional’s training is the learning by doing as John 
Dewey developed it. To Schön the microstructure of learning by doing is similar 
with the one of action type two reflection-in-action. To him learning is acting and 
the experience we gain by our actions constantly test and alter the knowledge we 
possesses. Further Schön refers to Carl Rogers and Plato’s Menon to show his 
understanding of the teacher’s role. The teacher assists the learners in their 
learning processes, who are in the end their own educators. They guide action 
and reflection of the learners and frame the learning environment. They reflect 
the intuitive forms of action of the learners and react to them with learning 
methods that match their needs.  
Further are the teachers coaches in Schön’s concept. They supervise the learners; 
this supervision is characterized in three ways: 
(1) The supervision is contextualised by the learning actions of the learner. Hence 
content of this supervision is always the objectification of the concrete learning 
process.  
(2) The coach not only uses articulation but also shows how something is really 
done (acting). This kind of mediating makes it possible for the learners to pick up 
implicit knowledge which could not be mediated by words alone, also because the 
learners normally lack speech and experience in enacting the new.  
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(3) The dialogue leads to two reflective ends caused by the mode of 
understanding communication. The learner probes in real situations what was 
understood through the supervision and if the understanding was based on right 
assumptions of the partner’s meanings. Thus the communicated meanings are 
constantly researched.  
Schön formulates three requirements reflective teaching and its coaching have, 
namely interest to what the learners say and do, the creation of strategies and 
competencies to learn from gained experience and to fight the normal cynicism. 
Learning from complex experiences means to learn from analogies rather than to 
copy strategies, or schemes which worked elsewhere. This iterative approximation 
to the unique situation enriches the already existing experience and helps 
encountering the new situation. The transformation of what was experienced is 
the key to a reflective transformation of experience, which is the goal of the 
efforts of reflective teaching and its coaching. Altrichter claims that according to 
this concept a case study is never a record of method which can be directly 
applied or replicated, but ‘a metaphor for the construction of a new program 
(Altrichter 2000, 212).’ 
Another important task of the coaches is to establish a relation with the learner 
which is beneficial to reflection, researching and learning. This is vital to the 
reflective process; because usually reflection starts from a point of surprise and 
unsolvable situations which are usually intimidating events for the single learner 
(professional), but exactly these events are the ones to be thematized in 
supervision. Altrichter cites Schön, telling that 
 ‘Reflective teaching opens a teacher to confusion, to not-knowing, 
hence to vulnerability, to anxiety provoked by vulnerability, and to 
defensive strategies designed often automatically [)] to protect against 
vulnerability [sic!] (Altrichter 2000, 212).’  
This process of reflective learning69 begins with a paradox for the learners because 
they are meant to learn something they do not understand and do something they 
are not capable of. They have to deal with the fact that they follow the teachers 
without knowing where the journey is going to and they live in the awareness that 
they can not follow their teachers forever, without knowing when the time is ready 
                                                
69 This also means self-educative learning. 
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to run another path. Altrichter claims that this state of disorientation and 
dependence causes much emotional stress for a lot of students (cf. ibid. 213). The 
institutional idea of this type of learning is the reflective practicum, it is guided by 
supervision and it is used to work of complex problems of the professional field. 
Instead of the classical traineeships Schön suggests to begin with a practical 
phase and then add theoretical courses which complete the training. According to 
Schön such a connection of practice and theory requires team teaching and 
teaching practitioners to evolve its potential.  
It should be mentioned that Schön’s ideas were mainly adopted in the Anglo-
American teacher training and here in the vocational training as well as in the 
basic training modules.  
 
‘You would better not accept something 
you do not want’ 
Critical summary 
In Schön’s theory acting is the antecedent, the starting point. Acting is revoked 
from a deductive technical rationality, similar to Meyer-Drawe and Polanyi, Schön 
takes into account, that there are things we cannot articulate and thus not 
research, at least not in a way we claim to be proper scientific research. Schön 
deals with the circumstance that there are contents which remain closed to this 
view on the world. Further is Schön constructing a term of reflection which is 
directly active in a present act, it does not have to be an event disconnected from 
action. Nevertheless his thinking is not residing within the sphere of practice and 
application, he also has an own idea of knowledge, which implies that his 
suggestions have also an epistemological dimension (cf. Altrichter 2000, 215); 
thus his theory does not withdraw itself from science, but refers to the undeniable 
fact that human immediacy permeates our life-world70. Schön’s idea of knowledge 
is a dynamic one because Schön observes knowledge in its active form in this form 
it is not separable from reflection. Yet the different types of action he describes 
show a varying relation of knowledge and reflection. While his idea of reflection is 
                                                
70 This immediacy has to be understood as immediacy within the framework of unconscious 
(formerly conscious) reflections (perceptual frameworks as Polanyi describes them), therefore this 
immediacy takes the human impossibility of a total  immediacy into account. It simply means the 
human resides inside the being.  
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bound to Dewey’s term of reflection, his focus on action enables him to integrate 
different pieces of acting in complex situations (which are insufficient explanations 
alone, like reframing), into a structural term of competent acting, which has a 
‘cyclic and iterative character [tbta] (ibid. 2000, 215)’.  
Here learning takes place in action, but has a strong connection to language and 
reflection. The awareness of the actual learning process is a vital element of his 
term of learning. Finally Schön neither understands learning, nor knowledge as 
intellectual concept, but as the achieving of a technique71. Schön’s theory is well 
known in the Anglo-American world not least because of his contemporary 
discussion of professional practice. Further he takes into account the value of 
practical knowledge and hits the core of a new self-esteem of reflective 
practitioners.  
Schön’s theory is politically ambivalent; it can provide traditional elements with 
reasons for their un-reflected acting and teaching, as well as it can foster the 
arguments of reformist powers which accuse traditional professionals to be 
followers of technical rationality (cf. ibid. 216). Schön’s work the reflective 
practitioner provides us with a lot of suggestions and new ideas, yet it has 
attracted a lot of criticism. The main arguments of the critics are that Schön mixes 
up the sphere of descriptive and prescriptive categories. Further he does not 
clarify his epistemological ideas, or associates them with other epistemologies of 
professionalism, this is problematic since there seems to be no connectivity to 
existing ideas (like technical rationality); on the one hand is the radical new 
character something inherent to experiencing and learning. On the other hand is it 
definitely critical that Schön’s idea has a difficult handling of scientific 
independence, but as Altrichter claims, this was not Schön’s goal in the first place. 
The major problem is not that Schön does not foster the value of the 
independence of the scientific sphere and knowledge, in fact if one thinks his 
theory carefully through scientific and practical knowledge are both treated 
equally. Still if we implement his suggestions of reflective practica one on one, we 
have to deal with the fact that this group of professionals will not be confronted 
with the tacit dimension of scientific acting and hereby they will probably not bring 
                                                
71 Altrichter sees this aspect of Schöns theory similar to Wittgenstein’s citation ‚the result of 
comprehensive- or learning process is a practice’.  
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in again their knowledge into a scientific discourse. That we need such discourses 
for every work field but especially inside the field of educational activities lies at 
hand when we see Schön’s idea of the logic of affirmation, which lies within the 
responsibility that the single practitioner carries inside his work field. This 
affirmative logic has to be seen as a potential risk, because it can lead to the 
bypass that a way of handling a situation is construed as helpful and appropriate, 
even if it is dangerous and inappropriate. For example ethical values the single 
professional carries can fall over board, which means they can be lost in the 
process of reflection-in-action. A reflective movement like the reflection-on-action 
concept (which is still a concept of acting more than of reflecting) is surely not 
enough to work the socio-historical grown structures of and disclose us 
discourses; but we need this kind of view. Schön is interested in practical 
knowledge and acting professionals, that is why he only tells us something about 
the scientific sphere as long as we do not leave the focus of acting professionals 
(inside a scientific field).  
Another reason why Schön is criticised is that his distinction between different 
types of reflection is not clear and his concept of three acting types is supposedly 
abbreviated. He answered to this critique that he is not searching for a clear 
separation of different action types, but for actions which are mainly different in 
the core of their character. Again we have to take into account that his description 
of reflective types is bound to the requirements of a theory of practical knowledge 
and professionalism, thus his idea of reflection-on-action maybe seems strange for 
a scientific view, because it is temporally hitched to the concrete situation but it is 
the modus needed for practice.  
The critique that Schön does not take into account that reflection is also initiated 
by the whish of clarification or curiosity, but only the perceiving of obstacles can 
be denied. The own curiosity and a whish for clarification of one always imply that 
one has recognized to be ignorant. This surprising event of recognition is the 
major obstacle that activates reflective problems. The more interesting question 
would be: Why do such obstacles lead to a reflective process, respectively where 
does the motivation come from to do so? This question surely requires an own 
contention. It is claimed that Schön’s idea of teaching is a too rationalistic concept 
in which the personal relatedness of the teacher is missing. This leads to the 
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circumstance that the observational stance (of the reflective and coaching 
teacher) is limited to observe behaviour and is not able to exhibit tacit knowledge. 
It sure has to be asked if this explication of tacit knowledge is a goal of Schön’s 
concept of teaching and to which extend. 
 
‘Slowly draw the trumps out of your pocket. 
You are unstoppable!’ 
Practical concerns 
The following chapter tries to consider the questions which were initiated by the 
first conversation with Ulla Böhme. It employs different concepts of vocational and 
institutional learning and leading to approach a practical field of professional 
acting, the deliberations accord to the demands of the aforementioned theoretical 
approach of reflection.  
 
‘Your talents will be acknowledged’ 
An operationalized Model of reflection 
McAlpine, Weston. J. Beauchamp, Wiseman and C. Beauchamp tried to take into, 
account the fact72 that ‘although there has been a great deal of reference to 
reflection in the literature, there is, in fact, little research that a) has been theory-
based, or b) has attempted to operationalize the term (McAlpine et. al. 1999, 
106)’.  
They conducted a research on successful university teaching; therefore they 
observed the reflective processes of six university professors in their day-to-day 
planning. To do so they needed a model of reflection they could operationalize for 
their observation, thus they defined the term and used it as a referential 
framework of their research. The work at hand is less interested in showing the 
results of the researched and rather suggest the reflection model of McAlpine and 
his colleagues as a considerably employable model for research in educational 
science, especially in the context of adult education; particularly because of its 
basic focus on reflection as the crucial interactive process between knowledge and 
action, in professional acting. The outlines of the concept as they were described 
by McAlpine (cf. ibid. 106-110): 
                                                
72 In referring to Kompf and Bond, Kremer-Hayon and Lanier Little.  
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The model is conceived as consisting of six components namely goals, knowledge, 
action, monitoring, decision making, and corridor of tolerance. Figure two shows 
the original diagram of McAlpine.  
 
 
Figure two ‘It represents an ongoing iterative process [...] it can be imagined as ongoing 
conversation. (McAlpine et. al. . 1999, 107) 
 
The timeframes of the process can vary as wells as the spheres of reflection.  
(1) Action and knowledge 
The interaction of the two inter-related elements action and knowledge is what 
the creators call reflection. Action is the external arena where the goals are 
implemented by observable behaviour. On the other hand knowledge represents a 
cognitive structure, lacking the transcend dimension mentioned above. The 
emergence of knowledge is depending on the factors experience and training. In a 
closer definition Polanyi’s idea of different types of knowledge is implemented into 
the model, as well as Meyer-Drawe’s idea of experience as reason for learning and 
the creation of new knowledge is being unwittingly in attendance.  
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(2) Goals 
The model takes the theoretical idea of goal directed behaviour as essential 
human activity into account, as well as the psychological idea of goals as driving 
instructional decisions. ‘The interaction between knowledge and action occurs 
related to specific goals that drive this thinking and action (ibid.108)’, this goals 
direct and constrain the other features and thus they are placed in the centre.  
(3) Monitoring and decision making 
The two mechanisms are linking action and knowledge in the model, yet they are 
restrained by the goals. Monitoring checks on the back-talk of the environment 
and compares it with the plans that rose from knowledge. Meanwhile decision 
making allows knowledge to flow and influences action. ‘Knowledge provides 
options or alternatives so that the outcomes of action match better the intended 
plan of the situation existing in knowledge (ibid. 108)’. Therefore decision making 
functions as the initiator or inhibitor of the enactment of plans.  
(4) Corridor of tolerance 
McAlpine and colleagues claims that this is their initial idea to explain why 
monitoring does not always leadto a change and this idea will be further observed 
in future research activities. The idea employs the thought of acceptable progress 
which reminds of Schön’s term of affirmative logic, suggesting that as long as the 
measured outcome of a situation is better than its starting point, it will be 
acknowledged as success by the practitioner.   
Further McAlpine considers the temporal structure of reflection and employs 
Polanyi’s action types two and three (reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action) 
to show that reflection can be temporally disconnected from concrete events. 
Then another type is introduced namely reflection-for-action, which is 
characterized not by reflecting onto an event in the past but in the future, using 
the own experiences and knowledge.  
Finally reflection is abstractly defined as ‘driven by goals, resulting in plans drawn 
from knowledge, leading to actions that are constantly being revised and updated 
as feedback is monitored through the corridor of tolerance and decisions lead to 
adjustments in actions (ibid. 109)’. This definition was operationalized from 
McAlpine and his partners and used to create qualitative interviews. Although this 
term of reflection surely does not meet the requirements of a philosophical meta-
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idea of reflection, it shows how reflection can be operationalized in the 
humanities.  
 
‘Great you keep the track even in complicated situations’ 
Learning Leaders 
John Hailey and Rick James claim in their article: ‘Learning leaders: The key to 
learning organisations (Hailey and James 2002)’ that key individuals of 
organisations play a vital role in the development of the organisational culture of 
learning and knowledge creation. This culture partly depends on the leadership of 
these key individuals ‘at the heart of a learning organisation is a learning leader 
(cf. Hailey and James 2002, 399)’. Thus, if we consider learning as a reflective 
event, at the heart of every learning organisation there also sits a reflective 
leader. Reflective Learning is important to the single organisation because it 
makes it capable of adapting to an uncertain future, likewise Schön’s idea that 
makes the single individual adapting to new and unforeseen practical situations.  
Referring to Senge Pedler Hailey and James understand by the term learning 
organisation an organisation which continuously expands its capacity to create its 
future and facilitates the learning of all its members, hereby constantly 
transforming itself. Inside the framework of such an organisation the individual is 
not simply an executive unit that follows rules and commands, but a primary 
information source, enabled by personal learning (cf. ibid. 399). For the learning 
organisation learning is about linking knowledge with action in a sustainable way. 
This linking depends on purposely reflective processes: 
 ‘The primary means of learning for most successful NGOs is the 
conscious reflection and analysis of their own implementation 
experiences (particularly where things have gone wrong) in order to 
learn and improve (ibid. 401)’.  
An open handling is important of failure and criticism, as long as that is 
understood as something that marks the individual as insufficient and that has to 
be avoided, there will not be the possibility to develop an adequate culture. Hailey 
and James show that numerous institutions have invented institutionalised 
meetings for reflection and allude that this is crucial to learn from experienced 
practice.  
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Albeit the importance of those key individuals learning on an organisational level 
can only happen through the participation of all staff members. Such participation 
can be represented by meets, workshops and other forms of congressing, this 
needs a mutual respect of staff in different hierarchical positions otherwise a free 
exchange will not occur. There are known concepts in which staff members 
change their positions for a period of time, professionals take management 
positions and manger’s work in professions they are unfamiliar with (cf. ibid. 402). 
Further it is important for the organisations, as described in the research of Hailey 
and James that they learn from formal training, from research and not least from 
evaluation and monitoring their own status as learning organisation. They also 
state that according to their results every organisation which was successful was 
committed to learning and development, some with more formal methods than 
others, but all with the goal to learn (cf. ibid. 404).  
The role of the leaders is highly important for these processes of learning 
and development: 
 ‘Leadership is central to organisational learning and that learning 
organisations have leaders who are facilitators and educators […]. Not 
only do founders tend to choose the organisation's mission and vision, 
but they also choose the staff. […] The case studies we have looked at 
bear this out. It was the drive and insight of key individuals in a 
leadership position who, with the support of their management team, 
actively promoted the strategic role of learning and championed new 
learning throughout the organisation (ibid. 404/405)’.   
Hailey and James comment on the different leadership between men and women 
that they could not research this field because only one person out of 16 past and 
present Chief Executives was a woman, although they see implications that 
women are better prepared to deal with challenging situations ‘as they have taken 
more bruises along the way (ibid. 405)’. Learning leaders are characterized as 
interested in their own individual development as well and not exclusively into the 
development of the whole organisation. Such managers are teachers and have 
‘specific learning competencies such as a learning orientation, a proactive stance 
towards problems, the ability to reflect critically, and a tolerance of critical 
feedback (ibid. 406)’. It is common to all the learning organisations that they are 
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staffed with learning people. This may seem trivial but if we reflectively reconsider 
the term of learning promoted by this work, we see that learning staff means 
more than staff with a high level of un-reflected explicit knowledge, or staff that 
undergoes constantly training which is not connected to the practice of the daily 
business. If people are really meant to learn, they need a highly differentiated 
environment to develop their abilities and to create knowledge. The knowledge 
they keep is then tied to the roots of their personality and hereby an active and 
dynamic resource to benefit from.  
The leadership style of successful learning leaders is depicted as being value 
driven, knowledge based, and responsive, also those leaders show a strong 
commitment to their tasks (cf. ibid. 406/407). Hailey and James conclude about 
efficient learning leaders: ‘Right at their core, they passionately believe in the 
importance of learning and knowledge in shaping the future of their organisation 
(ibid. 407)’. 
 
EMBL 
In an attempt to try answering the initial questions and provide further 
implications this part focuses on the needs and structures of EMBL. 
 
‘Your own efforts promise a lot of success’ 
Implications for EMBL 
Considering the specific history and the self-display of EMBL it has to be assumed 
that a lot of EMBL’s efforts already match the ideas of employing and promoting 
the concept of the learning leaders. The core missions of EMBL like ‘to train 
scientists, students and visitors at all levels (EMBL 2010)’ indicates that this 
concept is considerably taken into account.  
Yet further implementation of the aforementioned ideas can help improving the 
professional skills in enacting knowledge which for example has been gained in 
courses of the non-scientific training program.   
 
(1) Institutionalised meetings for joint reflection on different institutional levels. 
(2) An additional framework for mutual learning, enabled by workshops offered for 
staff by staff.  
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(3) Possibilities to learn about the different tasks of different jobs, to get new 
impulses for the own work. 
(4) Introducing reflective conversations by connecting the participation in the non-
scientific training program reflection-activating coaching, respectively the creation 
of a structure where reflective explication of gained knowledge is possible.   
(5) Participants’ reviews of courses. 
(6) Performing Reflection on evaluation.  
 
 (1) Institutionalised meetings for the exchange of ideas and reflection upon 
special problems could integrate the exchange of experiences between the 
employees. It could provide others with solutions for their own problems. Likewise 
the fore mentioned theories suggested that it could help to frame problems by 
using analogies. This idea could also be connected to the possibility of employing 
a virtual learning environment platoon like MOODLE73, this would meet the special 
needs of an organisation like EMBL whose different facilities are far away from 
each other, but still meant to be an organisation that develops as one. For 
example relevant positions at the several locations could be invented that would 
keep contact and provide the employees with information and access to the 
program.  
Of course the process of mutual reflection takes place in informal places like 
cafeterias as well. EMBL itself introduces an example on its homepage where 
problems were discussed in the cafeteria and in the end a great achievement to 
the molecular biology was the outcome. These structures could be researched and 
integrated into a concept of institutionalised reflection, especially inside EMBL’s 
extensive framework of informal courses offered by employees (like cooking 
courses) that would provide this idea with a lot of connectivity options. The first 
step to foster the implementation of this idea would be to evaluate if there are 
already structures of institutionalised reflection and how they work.  
 
 
                                                
73 Modular object oriented dynamic learning environment, an e-learning solution which has become 
quite popular during the last years.  
 76 
(2) An additional framework for mutual learning could offer the chance to review 
the practical dimension of special work fields. For examples workshops could be 
invented with the learning of leaders as major topic, participants could be leaders 
of different units and teams of EMBL. The framework could provide presentations 
of practitioners, discussion rounds and could thus foster the learning of leaders. 
This kind of offer would complete the more formal promotion of leader learning. 
An approach of this idea would first have to reconsider the given structures at 
EMBL particularly the outcomes of the initial plans of Ulla Böhme to invent a 
particular coaching for advanced leaders and even more important the formal 
training course for effective leaders that EMBL offers to employees in leading 
positions. In a first step the curriculum of this course would be researched, 
especially how the mediation of tacit knowledge is taken into account. In a second 
phase the gained information could help creating a workshop for example ‘leading 
labs and leading people’, where the practitioners could exchange their 
experiences. It would also offer a platform to external professionals, which could 
be invited to share knowledge.  
 
(3) The third idea indicates exchange programs where EMBL employees tell and 
show each other their work places and explaining there daily business. Especially 
the different locations of EMBL have completely different work fields; some are 
doing mouse biology whilst others work with advanced light cell imaging. But also 
several units like personnel and administration could benefit from such an 
exchange. It could help to identify with the organisation as whole, open new 
horizons of problem solving and create an atmosphere of transparency which 
enables the mutual exchange about processes.  
 
(4) The creation of a structure where reflective explication of gained knowledge is 
possible. Knowledge gained by formal training is, as we already know, not simply 
applied to new situations, but forms a tacit dimension; it resides in emerging in a 
reflective process of analogisms and brought together with professional acting in 
concrete situations. Professional development through formal training, like the 
non-scientific training EMBL offers, needs reflection to come to its full potential 
and to minimize the risk of unwanted outcomes. This is meant neither reflection-
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in-action nor reflection-on-action, but reflection-for-action; a temporally 
disconnected reflection from the concrete situation. This makes the situation and 
the personal acting understandable, as meaningful whole within wholes. But how 
could such an idea look like in daily practice? 
Baernstein and Fryer-Edwards (Baernstein and Fryer-Edwars 2003) have 
conducted a research about the efficiency of interventions promoting professionals 
reflection. They used a randomized trial study with fourth-year medical students. 
These students took part in a four week enduring clerkship in emergency 
medicine. Baernstein and Fryer-Edwards evaluated three interventions: the critical 
incident report74 (CIR), the CIR followed by an interview with a faculty member 
and the interview without the CIR. The results showed clearly that writing CIRs as 
well as writing CIRs combined with an interview was not as successful when it 
came to qualified in depth reflection on the own actions the students made. ‘One-
on-one interviews most effectively elicited reflection on professionalism (ibid. 
742)’. The faculty members conducting the interviews were not participating in 
grading the interviewed students. 
It would not be appropriate to simply implement such interviews into a 
performance management process at EMBL or any other organisation because a 
reflective conversation needs an atmosphere which is free from the threatening of 
judgement and efficiency rating. The offering of such interviews a period of time 
after an employee has taken part in a staff training program would have to be 
conducted by a person that is not involved in rating the participant, otherwise this 
could lead to the circumstance that interviewees answer as they expect it to be 
desired by the interviewer. It lies at hand that the evaluation of these interviews 
and the advising on the basis of this evaluation is a highly professionalized process 
itself. It would probably afford a particular coach or supervisor with therapeutically 
training to manage this task. Meanwhile the benefits through such an 
implementation could be a big deal for the staff development because professional 
feedback could help the single employees to develop their learning process and 
unfold their potentials.  
 
                                                
74 The CIR is a method where students reflect their practical experiences by writing down critical 
events they experienced during their training.   
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(5) Participants’ reviews 
The single courses of the non-scientific training catalogue of EMBL are described 
by: length, language, the target group, a short description of the course, aims and 
outline of the program as well as information about restrictions to the attendance 
figure. One of the initial questions was, if people were really able to benefit from 
the specific contents of courses, so why not ask them in the first place. 
How would the participants of the courses describe them afterwards? Former 
participants could articulate their experiences with the course and reflect upon the 
experiences they have made and how it has affected their professional acting. 
These descriptions could provide other employees with first hand experiences of 
people who are familiar with their own work field and daily practices, they 
certainly share a familiar kind of tacit knowledge about their profession. This could 
also be implemented into an EMBL wide virtual platform.  
It would also complete the current intervention by EMBL’s evaluation75 sheet, 
which would be an interesting object of a closer research.  
 
(6) Reflection evaluation 
One of the most vital questions Ulla Böhme asked in the first interview was, if the 
participants were capable of applying what they had learned in the different 
course. As we have seen one of the problems is the idea of technical rationality to 
‘apply’ a certain explicit knowledge. 
 After intense contention with this question the answer is multidirectional: 
a) We will not predict by any kind of evaluation form that concerns a special 
course, if the participants are capable of enacting knowledge they gained in 
the courses. This is because the course can only activate the binding of 
knowledge, the reflective processes needed to act will not be learned inside 
the framework of a course76. 
                                                
75 EMBL uses currently an evaluation sheet that contains questions about the course, the 
instructors, the visual materials and other issues like the workload, the specialisation of the 
workload and the relation of time and objectives. Further the participants have the possibility to 
describe strong and weak features of the program, give recommendations and indicate other 
topics. The questionnaire is anonymous and explains only to be used for the purpose of helping to 
plan future training. Inside the framework of this paper was a closer research indicated but not 
realisable.  
76 Still we try to simulate real decisions in classes and courses in adult training and beyond, just 
think of role-plays in trainings or the section of bodies in medicine. Still these settings remain as 
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b) It is possible to implement methods such as reflexive learning (Reis 2009, 
100-120) into the repertoire of trainers. By extending the trainer’s abilities 
to teach, the participants could get offered better chances of binding more 
knowledge in a tacit way (through role-plays etc.); but since the conditions 
of such binding of knowledge are very likely extremely different, it would be 
an absurd idea to check the usage of those methods of reflective learning 
by evaluation forms, to find out about the abilities to enact knowledge. 
Even if one participant would benefit from reflexive learning, another one 
could forfeit the chance to do so by the same method and we would still go 
on observing the level of gathering knowledge and not the reflective 
enacting of the same. 
c)  Finally there is the option to find out about the showed behaviour if a 
subject is capable of professional action but that is not telling us where the 
origins of this knowledge are (it could lie outside a training course). So we 
would only locat professional acting in a showed performance, but still the 
connection to the learning context would remain unknown. 
d) The author sees the following possibility to benefit from the results of the 
researched links, between knowledge and action, by the work at hand: A 
qualitative arranged study could analyze what kind of structures specifically 
at EMBL lead to successful reflective processes to enact gained knowledge 
and hereby lead to foster structures which are supportive to such 
processes. A first attempt would be to find participants that represent 
successful enactors of knowledge gained in the non-scientific training 
program. In a second step the successful actors could be interviewed about 
their reflective processes in the day-to-day use of knowledge they have 
gained in training and staff development, therefore McAlpine’s model of 
reflection and data gathering could be employed. A third step would be to 
analyze similarities and differences in the gathered data to get information 
about institutional structures that could help fostering reflective enacting-
processes, also existing structures could be revealed, enhanced and made 
                                                                                                                                              
set educational contexts which can never fully depict the individual sphere of a professional work 
field.  
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available for all employees, providing them with better chances of 
benefitting from vocational training.  
 
Drafts of designing a qualitative study  
The implications above led to the idea of developing a qualitative study which 
could help to find out more about structures that support the successful acting of 
professionals, by providing them with possibilities to reflect upon gathered 
knowledge respectively gained information.  
The definition (which would need to be further research and coordination with the 
concrete situation at EMBL) of the successful enactor could be: 
The successful enactor is capable of enacting explicit and implicit knowledge 
gained in the vocational training and staff development inside the framework of 
his professional day to day tasks.  
The successful enactor is maybe not capable of telling us which knowledge is used 
to act, but the enactor knows if he or she is successfully acting in a trained field.  
Participants that could be such successful enactors could be employees of EMBL 
who took part in the training program of EMBL; the time should not lie back too 
far. Maybe not more than two months. Always the last course should be the 
focused one. 
 
‘It is not the time that counts but what you make of it’ 
The interview 
Based on the idea of successful enactors, learning leaders and the models of 
reflection in the former chapters a draft of an expert interview was developed. 
The following implementations indicate how an interview which is interested in the 
named structures can look like: 
 
Information ahead: 
The preparation of the interviews is executed in the following way:  
The interviewers introduce themselves, tell their names and the institution they 
are associated with, in the particular case ‘student at the University of Heidelberg, 
Institute of educational science’ and the name. The interviewees get a short 
explanation about the goals/object of the interview: the links between knowledge 
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and action are researched with a particular focus on reflection as crucial process 
to their interaction. The concrete research interest is to find out about structures 
which help the single participant of the non-scientific training program of EMBL to 
reflect on gained knowledge and hereby be able to improve their professional 
skills. Then it has to be asked if the participants agree that the interview is 
recorded and they are to be informed that the gained data gets anonymised, 
especially the personal data. The sex of the interviewee should be noted and if the 
participants agree to everything and do not have any further questions, the 
interview starts with the first question. 
 
 
The questions  
The questions were designed by the presumptions based on the first conversation 
with Ulla Böhme and the insights that occurred during the theoretical work of the 
paper. Additively a dimensional model is indicated to support the conceptualizing 
of the further questions. The questions below are presented with further 
information about their function and a sampling of highly likely answers. The 
questions are sequenced into blocks and are linked together77; the concrete 
interview situation will need an interviewer that adjusts the sequence of the 
questions, for example to react to the event that a question is answered before it 
was asked.  
The notes what sex the participants are enables the possibility to research 
possible relations between sex and the focus of the research, when such 
differences are indicated by gathered data. 
 
1. What is your position at EMBL? 
Different structures of reflection are likely for different levels of management, this 
question further opens the possibility of insights on differences in intensity or 
frequency of reflection, relating to the position the interviewees hold.  
2. How long have you been working for EMBL? 
                                                
77 For example question two has intended associations with all the following question about the 
reflective processes and the experiences with the course.  
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A lot of EMBL’s positions are limited to a period of five years, afterwards the 
contract succeeds and the employee leaves EMBL. The experience employees of 
different employment periods have gained about reflective processes after training 
courses is interesting.  
 
3. When did you first start working in the field you are working in? 
In addition to question two it is of interest, how experienced the interviewee is in 
total. Possible answers like ‘10 years’ could be followed by an additional question 
about the number of former employers because differences are to be expected not 
just by the length of employment but also the variety.  
4. Which courses of the non-scientific training program of EMBL did you attend? 
It is must be expected that some participants maybe have taken part in more 
than just one course by now and that this caused changes to their 
presumptions about the outcomes of the course that is thematized, or about 
their needs. For example they could have better, because longer tested, 
strategies of using structures that support reflection. Additionally, question five 
is then interested in the comparability of the official goals in the descriptions of 
the courses like ‘develop a practical networking strategy’ with the goals 
participants used to have beforehand and reached afterwards is to explore.  
 
 
 
5. Which is the last course you attended and what were the goals in the course 
description? 
If this is not already answered by question four, this question is also meant to 
focus the following questions on the last course attended. It is important to know 
the concrete name of the attended courses to be able to find the course 
descriptions in EMBL’s catalogue.  
6. Which concrete contents were mediated in the course? 
This questions draws on explicit contents the participants remember like ‘we 
learned how to generate attractive figures and tables’, the question also draws on 
explicit knowledge the interviewee remembers like ‘that it is always important to 
define risks and opportunities’.  
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7. When you think about why you attended to the course, what was the 
motivation and what were your goals? 
This question is interested in the circumstances of attending. Was the motivation 
to attend coming from own impulses or did the participant have to take part by 
instruction? If the interviewee is capable of reconstructing them, the concrete 
goals are of interest and later on if they matched with the final outcomes. Since 
the research indicates that the ‘final outcomes’ the implementation of the course 
contents are owed to reflective processes it would matter if these processes in 
turn also depended on motivation.  
8. Did you have any sceptical thoughts when you attended? 
The question is wether or not sceptical thoughts beforehand are influencing 
effects of the later outcomes, if the participants did have sceptical thoughts it is 
intended to ask them further if there experiences dissolved them or if they were 
fostered. Possible answers could be ‘no, since I had taken part in three other 
courses before I was sure it would be a good training for me, so I was relaxed and 
did not have any concerns when I applied for the course’, but also ‘I am always 
uneasy being amidst strangers and that its why I was concerned about taking part 
in the course’.  
9. Do you intend to participate in such courses in the future? 
It is expected that young participants are more likely to answer that they will 
definitely take part in further training and development programs, but it also is of 
interest if the participants would take part in a similar course again, if their goals 
of improving skills or knowledge have not been reached.  
 
10. Which skills did you hope to improve? 
Question ten and eleven are intended to show if the participants distinguish 
between practical skills and more intellectual ones. If the interviewees ask what is 
meant by the question, the next question could be mentioned to contrast the both 
options of intellectual and practical skills. Again the measuring with the outcomes 
is important 
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11. Which explicit knowledge did you hope to gain? 
This question goes together with question ten.  
 
12. Are you able to apply knowledge you have gained in the course inside the 
institutional framework of your workplace at EMBL? 
For reasons of understanding, the question uses the technological expression 
‘application’ which implicates the application of knowledge, although this is not 
according with the theoretical idea of this work, it has to be assumed that the 
participants will understand the intended question best by this expression. Another 
source of information this question aims for is, if the structures at the concrete 
workplace allow the application of contents learned in the course. In vocational 
training a lot of learned contents in courses are not ‘applied’ because the concrete 
professional situation hinders the employees to enact their improved skills. These 
hindrances can occur from different variables of the setting like a lack of time or 
the unwillingness of colleagues to support new ideas. 
13. Are you able to apply such knowledge in your private life? 
Development of personal skills always has impacts on the whole personality of 
learners and maybe some participants only experience the attended course as 
altering their private life, still the reflow of such impacts on the vocational sphere 
would be programmed. Interviewees could answer that they exclusively used 
special knowledge like ‘management skills’ in their vocational training but also that 
they used such knowledge in private settings.  
 
14. Were you able to improve your professional practice by attending to the 
course? 
This question is further investigating on what Schön calls ‘affirmative logic’ and 
what is the ‘corridor of tolerance’ in McAlpine’s model of reflection. It aims on the 
information if the whole situation has changed positively, independent from the 
concrete reasons of change. So could the participants tell that a concrete 
professional situation is easier for them to handle now, although they have not 
reached goals they intended or the course had initially implied. Additionally the 
answers to this question show, if the consider attending the course to be a 
success or not. 
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15. Do you associate things in your daily life to the course content? 
Associated to the results of McAlpine and his colleagues, this question draws on 
the presumption that reflective processes take part in different life spheres and 
not restricted to concrete activities (reflection-on-action and reflection-for-action). 
Associative abilities seem to play a vital role for reflective processes.  
 
 
16. Have you shared experiences with other people about the contents of the 
course? 
An articulation of the experiences made with the gained knowledge, maybe even a 
mutual explication of tacit knowledge into an explicit form seems to be one the 
structures which enable a reflective contention with experiences and knowledge of 
attended courses.   
17. Whom did you talk to and what was the conversation about? 
Especially superiors, colleagues who also attended the course, other participants 
and peers of the individual participant are expected to be dialogue partners. 
Question seventeen further investigates if question sixteen was positively 
answered.  
18. What did your boss and your colleagues think about you attending to the 
course? 
This question is subsequent to sixteen and seventeen asking implicit for 
conversations with colleagues and superiors, but also about the atmosphere at the 
workplace, relating directly to question twelve this question is also interested in 
the individual institutional framework.  
 
 
19. Do you think it could help you to talk to other participants of the course again 
to exchange experiences you made with practically applying the contents to 
improve your practice?  
Here it is of interest if the participants assume conversation about their reflective 
processes (‘applying’, implies here that reflective processes are at work), to be 
helpful for improving this ‘application’. Maybe some participants think of their 
 86 
application as too individual to benefit from the experiences of others. Those 
participants would be interesting when it comes to the worth of communicative 
abilities and communication types and their reflection abilities.  
 
20. Do you have suggestions what kind of structures at EMBL help to transfer 
knowledge of such courses into action?  
The last and open question tries to win new horizons for the dimensional analysis 
and insights on existing structures which may have been left out in the first design 
of the questions.   
 
‘Rome was not build in a day’ 
Conclusions  
The major goal of this work was to approach a scientific educational term of 
reflection; therefore I used the way of employing a practical concern, namely the 
interests of EMBL to develop the concrete interrogation.  
Looking back to the beginning of this paper, the initial spark for my interest for 
reflection, reflexivity and reflective processes has its origins in the German 
literature of educational science. The term reflection is here used as if it was a 
sentence on a Tibetan prayer wheel; authors concerned with theoretical and 
practical approaches towards any parts of the sphere of education, constantly 
repeat and re-repeat the importance of reflection. So I decided to make myself 
familiar with the term – an exhausting search began, during which I encountered 
countless ways of how different authors used reflection; most of them either used 
it to describe a thoughtful turning back to past events or used it to fill up 
theoretical gaps with the term to disguise that the single theories which they 
employed exceeded their range when it came down to a practical implementation 
of their ideas. Some even deeply underestimated the term by using it 
synonymously for ‘thinking’. Nonetheless these authors continuously refused to 
share their explicit theoretical or practical knowledge with me about what 
reflection is. They also rejected to provide me with vital information about sources 
of their assumptions. In the following time I made up several explanations why 
the situation had developed this way, namely that I constantly felt like I was 
ending up in a dead end. Two of my major ideas were: (1) the term itself is so 
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commonly known among the different actors in the field of educational science 
that there is simply no need for further explanation of it. (2) They authors using 
the term draw on an intuitive feeling (or maybe a hope) that this term could 
complete or complement the theories they employ, without keeping an explicit 
knowledge about what denotes it. After a journey through historical and common 
dictionaries of educational practice and theory, as wells as a huge amount of 
literature which decided not to answer my questions, my recent point of view 
developed. The German literature of educational science lacks a definition, even a 
serious approach to a concept of reflection, yet its theories suffer from this lack of 
knowledge. Implicitly showing their need for the structures and insights a scientific 
educational concept of reflection could provide them with, every time they (ab)use 
the term because they turn it into a stopgap.  
This work tries to develop a draft and give hints what an educational scientific 
term of reflection could look like, to explicate such a term the connections 
between knowledge and action were focussed. One of the initial questions was: Is 
reflection a conscious or unconscious, an initial or automated process? In order to 
do so the metaphor of the rug loom is employed again. The rug loom has a foot 
pedal; the starting point when we first step onto this pedal sets reflection in 
motion, our ongoing treading as an unconscious process. Further scientific 
research could investigate our biological presuppositions and the primers which 
set the function in motion. We need this reflection to communicate with the world 
which constantly surges against our consciousness. Meanwhile with our hands, 
purposeful and willingly we guide the threads of the rug loom, our prior 
knowledge and weave them together with new knowledge we gain by learning. 
We do not control the threads and hereby the knowledge which we get to weave, 
because we constantly experience the world, but we decide partially which threads 
we keep, which ones we integrate and emphasize in the cloth and which ones we 
do not. By our constant treading we build up a perceptual framework by which we 
recognize meaning and reason our eyes become used to recognizing useful 
threads and common patterns in the cloth and after a time even our hands seem 
to work unconsciously although it was a long process of learning until we got to 
this professional performing the task. But then we constantly have the possibility 
to look at our hands, work new patterns into the cloth and see what the outcomes 
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are, this happens only when we encounter a situation where something does not 
fit into our perception, our expectations fail. We work a pattern into the cloth and 
suddenly a thread changes its usual colour or rips apart. Then we look onto our 
hands, recognize the new and think of a solution, a new pattern. This event can 
be caused by the environment or by ourselves.  
Reflection is an unconscious but initial process that goes on our whole life; it is the 
constant contention with the texture the being offers us. It is unconscious, 
because we can not stop it, we can not shut ourselves of from the being since we 
are a bodily part of it. But we try to focus into a certain direction to search for 
mirror images we hope to find. We encounter a feeling for this circumstance the 
most when we try to put a perspective onto the world which just does not fit. By 
reflection we are transgressing ourselves and the world and then fall back into it. 
It is working at the border of the human sanity and comprises intuition, explicit 
knowledge, which we like to think of as reliable, and all the other forms 
knowledge is expressing itself like mechanical reproductions of our muscles or the 
reproduction of argumentations we are used to work off. Reflection as an 
involuntary possibility of the human existence characterizes our break with a 
natural immediacy and our natural ability to learn. It is a biological and mental 
ability. The working off of unforeseen events is what we call learning as 
experience, a connection between the given and the new. This term of reflection 
is surely not brought to a conclusion by the aforementioned but it gives us some 
hints where further research could intend to start at. Further it implicates already 
a lot for the practice of learning and teaching and the linking of knowledge and 
professional action as it was tried to show above. 
Finally it has to be mentioned that the framework of this paper purposely skipped 
a major source which could provide us, if it is employed by further research, with 
even more vital information for a scientific educational term of reflection. This 
source is historical and recent concepts of education. The title learning, 
‘knowledge and action – an approach towards a scientific educational term of 
reflection’ already implies that the most crucial part of an educational term, 
namely the role of education inside the framework of this paper, is not exclusively 
employed. This is especially true for historical concepts of education, the reason 
for leaving out this perspective is simply that the framework of this thesis does not 
 89 
provide enough time and space to reflect upon this dimension. This is owed to the 
fact that there is no nameable literature on this topic, although there is a major 
work of the German professor Elmar Tenorth in release, which will provide new 
insights on the historical dimension of reflection in educational science and 
pedagogy.  
In a second thought this work does not explicitly but implicitly employ a concept 
of education. The structures that foster reflective movement are researched so 
they can be operationalized, institutionalised – namely to make fields of action 
visible as fields of education, making them ‘visible’ already implies that they are 
not as obviously seen as educational settings, as for example the teaching in 
vocational courses or in schools is recognized as educational acting. Here the 
teaching inside the courses of EMBL was left out on purpose, because they were 
not expected to provide any insights into the reflective structures and for a term 
of reflection, because they already underlie presumptions about reflection, 
because they employ a educational concept. The same reason leads to the 
circumstance that concepts of competency were left out by this paper, because 
they also draw on an intuitive assumption of reflective capabilities of the single 
learner. Consequently further research has to investigate the historical dimension 
of reflection in concepts of education, search for structures that foster reflection in 
other educational spheres of activity and develop an even deeper understanding 
of the philosophical dimension of an educational term of reflection. A starting 
point from this work to research recent educational concepts onto their 
connectivity to reflective forms could be the educational learning concept of 
learning to live (Leben lernen) of professor Jörg Zirfas (Zirfas 2009), because it 
employs the idea that learning is divided in the cumulative activities of learning 
knowledge, learning action, learning to learn and learning to live. Further an 
investigation of the pragmatic philosophy could provide new insights, especially in 
association with Dewey’s concept of reflection.  
The further reconditioning of reflection and reflexivity, their intentional character, 
their genuine educational declaration and not at least their capability as vital spot 
of a educational idea that could renew theories of learning and educating lies 
within the future.  
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‘Your patience is being abused but finally rewarded’ 
 
 
 
PS  
Probably, you have recognized the prophecies and legacies of wisdom which 
accompanied the single chapters?!  
Those were the insights of my favourite biscuits – fortune cookies – besides the 
fact that they taste horrible, they provide me on a daily basis with two holy and 
sacred major insight. The first and less important one is that phrase-mongering is 
one of the most common spread and unreasonable human practices we depend 
on and the second one is, although I am capable of telling that there is this low 
paid employee putting the little papers into the cookies, I cant stop from 
contextualising the phrases with my life world. I cannot distance myself far 
enough so I am not at least slightly irritated or angry, because I fail to pass those 
slips of paper by without referring, associating, interpreting and integrating them 
with my perceptual framework until their meaning is my personal meaning.  
Today I dare suggesting to rather taking them as invitation than as irritation, let 
them show us our reflexive nature and qualities to reflectively transgress what has 
never actively bound us.  
 
‘Lean back and relax. You deserve it’’ 
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